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1 
INTRODUOTION 
New Zealand has a total are~ of 66~4 million. ,acres, 
of which 44 million are classified as occupied farm land. 
More than 40 per cent of this latter area is held under 
leasehold tenure. The Orown is the landlord of 14.9 
million acres which are let under several formsl of leasing 
arrangement" 
In recent years there have been mark~d in.creases in 
land prices throughout New Zealand o kresult of this has 
been a substantial increase in rents, which has caused m.any 
farmers to become disaffected with leasehold tenure. The 
Oommittee of Investigation into Rentals and Freeholding of 
OroWD. Leases (1968), convened by the Minister of Lands, . 
studied this problem and has forwarded to Parliament re-
commendations fcDD an amendment to the 1948 Land Act. 
The subject of this study is OroWD. Renewable lease 
tenure and its effect on farm investment~ It falls naturally 
into three parts: firstly, a descriptive section provi"d-
ing a resum~ of the history of land tenure in New Zealand, 
and defining the terms of OroWD. Renewable lease tenure. 
The second part investigates the micro-economic aspects 
bf this form of tenancy. This section takes as given the 
2 
terms of the lease and investigates various courses of 
action at the farm level" A case study approach is used 
to explore the economics of alternative investment 
opportunities open to all. individual lessee.. In the third 
part, macro-economic aspects of Crown Renewable lease 
tenure are investigated.. This section examines whether 
or not this form of tenure promotes efficient resource 
allocation, and is concerned with the community's point 
of view rather than that of the ind;Lvidual" 
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PART I 
DESCRIPTION OF 
CROWN RENEWABLE LEASE TENURE 
".',.,-", 
4 
OHAPTER I 
OROWN LAND TENURE IN NEW ZEALAND 
The Land Settlement Board acting through the Lands 
and Survey Department administers all Orown leasehold land" 
The characteristics of different Orown leases are contained 
within various acts of Parliament.. Of the 14 .. 9 million , 
acres let by the Orown 12 million fall under the 
jurisdiction of the 1948 Land Act.. Forty-four per cent of 
the remaining 2 .. 9 million acres is held under Lease in 
PerpetuitY9 for which the term is 999 years at a fixed 
rental. Table 1 provides a summary of the main forms of 
tenure by which farmers leased land from the Orown in 1970 .. 
Leases 
Renewable 
Pastoral 
Perpetuity 
TABLE 1 
Farm Land Let by the Orown 
Under the 1948 
Land Act 
Number Area in 
Under Acts other than 
the 1948 Land Act 
Number Area in 
of leases acres(OOOs) of leases acres(OOOs) 
4722 2581 
499 7458 
6299 1273 
Deferred Payment 
Licences 2134 923 
5 
The two main types of leasehold tenure for which the 
1948 Land Ac-t is the relevant authority are Pastoral and 
Renewable leases. Pastoral leases are confined to high 
country areas and have an annual rental which is set every 
thirty=three years. The lessee has the right of renewal 
but cannot purchase the land .. 
Sever.teen per cent of the land let by the Crown is 
let to farmers under renewable leases, the terms of which 
are contained in the 1948 Land Act. These leases are 
scattered throughout New Zealand,and embrace all types of 
farming. As this form of tenancy permits freeholding, the 
lessee is confronted with a further investment alternative. 
The History of Land Tenure in New Zealand 
Throughout New Zealand's short history~ problems con-
cerning the ownership of land have cauged many political 
controversies. The first :permanent residents bartered with 
the Maoris directly when purchasing land. The complicated 
form of Maori ownership and the speculative nature of some 
of the purchases led to many conflicting claims on land by 
both factions. To prevent further confusion, Governor GreY7 
soon after his arrival in 1845, decreed that future land 
purchases from the Maoris would be carried out by the 
Governmert.t only.. The land bought in this way ;was then re-
sold or let to settlers. 
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When this Government monopoly of land purchases was re-
voked in 1862, most of the South Island and large areas 
of the North Island were in European hands, Grey was 
antagonistic towards' i landlordism I as it was known in 
England at that timeo He considered that every immigrant 
should be able to purchase his own block of land, and to 
achieve this end he lowered the price of lan.d to 5 an.d 10 
shillings per acre o Although this may have helped some 
settlers with limited capital to obtain land 9 it facilitated 
the creation of large estates by the more wealthy immigrants" 
At this time settlers in the Wakefield colonies faced the 
iniquitous situation of paying a high fixed price for land 
ow.ned by the New Zealand Company~ whereas other settlers 
, 
were accumulating land from the Crown at a much lower p:dice 
under the auspices of Grey's ediato 
Between 1840 and 1858 CroWD. lands were:,sold 9 reserved 
for public uses, granted under special authority, leased 
un.der grazing licences 9 or occupied for timber cuttingo 
Although new provincial legislation required the assent of 
the Governor, the provinces introduced various forms of 
land tenure 0 After 1876 9 when the provinc'ial governmen ts 
were abolished 9 all land legislation was initiated by the 
central Government 0 The enactment of the Land Act 1877 
replaced provincial land statutes with one uniform system 
of land administrationo In place of the provinces, ten 
land districts were set up with a land board for each 
district and a Commissioner of Crown Lands in charge~ 
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This was the forerunner of the Lands and-Survey Department's 
current organ~sation~ 
Sutch (19699P~121) has pointed out that if the 
quarter of a centu~y prior to 1890 produced effects~ the 
following twenty=five years produced results~ Immediately 
before 1890 the Conservatives had dominated the government, 
and wage earners had in general received scant recognition .. 
Although attempts had been made to form unions~ the con-
dition of the econo'my and the attitude of the employers 
precluded succesS~ The poverty experienced in New Zealand 
during the 1880s precipitated the fall of Atkinson's Con-
servatives in 1890 and the election of the Liberal Party 
led by Ballance.. Though the Conservatives knew by 6 
December 1890 that they had been defeated they remained 
in office until 23 January 18910 During'the intervening 
six weeks they recommended to the Governor that six 
addi tional Cons'ervatives be appointed' to the Legislative 
Council~ This was done~ and for the next two years the 
COUll,cil was able to frustrate the Liberals' attempts at 
legislat,ion~ as all hills ~ except those related, to finance, 
could be rejected by themo Nevertheless'the Liberals 
managed to pass some bills 9 often ~fter many changes had 
'been made to the original,clauses o 
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By 1890, there existed many large estates of both free= 
hold and leasehold lando Considerable areas had already been 
freeholded in response to the low price of Crown land, and 
a form of lease tenure which parmi tted prospective ,settlers, 
as well as the lessee, ~to freehold leasehold land~ This led 
to the system known as gridironing, as in self-defence 
lessees had to freehold strategic areas of land to protect 
their tenure 0 The Liberal Party which drew much of its 
support from the owners of small properties, and aspiring 
farmers came into power pledged to break down the monopoly 
of land own,ershipo Hence a large part of its legislative 
program was directed towards encouraging closer settlemento 
By this time the theories of Ricardo and Mill were well-
known and the concept of taxitl,g the 'unearned increment 9 
associated with land ownership enjoyed wide supporto The 
Liberal Party introduced land tax on a graduated scale 
envisagin.g that it would fall more heavily on the owners of 
large acreages. The Crown, was also given the power to re-
purchase land for settlemento Although it is difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which theBe measures were effective, 
the size of holdings decreased markedly over the next 
twenty yearso Sinclair (1959~po162) records that by 1911 
the total area of privately"=ownecl lan,d in holdings over 
10,000 acres had fallen from 7 to 3 million acres. Although 
some estates were purchased by the Crown and resettled, 
9 
others were broken into smaller units and sold by the 
owners themselves~ 
Rolleston 9 who had been Superintendent of Oanterbury, 
considered that the Orown should retain ownership of the 
remaining Orown land~ To this end he introduced a bill 
creating a perpetual lease to be revised after thirty years~ 
However, by the time it became the Land Act 1882, there had 
been added to it a clause conferring on the lessee the 
right of purchase. The tenure form Lease in Perpetuity, 
was initiated by the Liberal Party. They intended it to 
be a lease with periodic rent renewals and no right of 
freehold, but were forced to accept the curious compromise 
of Lease in Perpetuityo These le-ases could be taken up 
until 1907 when the law allowing this type of tenancy was 
rescinded. However, some settlers were reluctant to farm 
under Lease in Perpetuity tenancy 9 instead preferring a 
renewable lease system whereby they had the right of free-
hold. 
The role of the Orown as landlord had been established 
by the early 1900s. The depression of the late 1800s eased 
with the rise in world prices of agricultural produce which 
began in 1895 and continued for the next twenty years. The 
greater prosperity enjoyed by farmers increased the demands 
made by state tenants for the right of freehold, and this 
concept has remained of paramount importance. The forms of 
10 
land tenure offered by the Orown. have frequently been 
modified during this century~ legislation often being con~ 
cerned with the rehabilitation of ex=servicemen o The Land 
Act of 1948 consolidated previous Land legislation by which 
the Or own. let land under a wide variety of tenures~ Although 
it retained in existence the forty or more different types 
of Orown 18ases, this Ac't did provide for most of these to 
be replaced 9 at renewal, by leases under the 1948 Land Act. 
The thirty=three year renewable leas-e was established as 
the standard tenure for both new leases and renewals of 
former leaseso 
Throughout its history of lafi.d ownership the Orown has 
seldom relied solely on market forces to determine rentals·.· 
An. exception to this was pastoral runs which, until this 
law was revoked, were auctioned at the time of renewal o 
Orown. Renewable Lease Tenure 
The condi tions pertaining to Orown. Renewable leases 
are contained in the 1948 Land Act, and its subsequent 
amendments. These leases extend for a term of thirty-three 
years with a perpetual right of renewal for the same term, 
and with the exception of the rent, under the same conditions. 
Seyeral restraints imposed on the lessee by the 1948 Land 
Act are seldoII:\ invokedo Some examples of these are that 
1 1 
the lessee~ reside on the land, maintain all improvements 
belongin.g to the Crown, insure buildings against fire and 
obtain prior approval to sell trees which are included in 
the leaseo Although the lessee must inform the Land 
Settlement Board if the property is to be sold, the rent 
is not changed at the time of sale, unless it is a transfer 
between a discharged serviceman and a civilian. 
When the lease is to be renewed, the new rental value 
,r 
is determined by the Land Settlement Board between two or 
three years prior to the termination of the lease period o 1 
Four values~are ascertained: 
(a) The value of the improvements as defined in the 
1948 Land Act, which are in existence and not exhausted on 
the lanrl included in the lease. These must have been 
purchased by the lessee or his predecessomat the beginn~ng 
of the lease or carried out by them during the lease. 
(b) The value of the Crown's improvements. 
(c) The value of the land included in the lease, 
exclusive of the above improvements. 
(d) The capital value, defined as the property's 
estimated market value at the time of valuation. 
The sum of (a), (b), and (c) must not exceed the 
capital value of the property. The rental value is given .. 
by (b) and ( c L 
1. This valuation is carried out by the Valuation Department, 
for the Land Settlement Board. 
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The rental value is synonymous with the unimproved 
value of the land on most of those properties where the 
Or own. does not own. any improvements .. ,1 There are two 
reasons why these values may differ.. Firstly, because 
the lessee is awarded the value of improvements he has put 
~ the lando The Valuation of La.:r..l.d .Act 1951 permits any 
improvement8~ if they are paid for by the lessee, to be 
excluded from the unimproved value', although they may not 
actually be on the property" Secondly, 'because leases 
whfch commence at a time when the pJ\lpp'erties have de-
teriorated from their original state'may have rental 
values which differ from their respective unimproved 
values. 
At present the ann.ual rent is determined as five per 
cent of the rental value.. The proportion of the rental 
va.lue which determines the rent is termed the rental rate .. 
The rent is paid in half-yearly in.stalments due on 1 
January and 1 July? Half a per cent of the rental value \ 
is ad de d to the ann.ual r,ent if payment is no t made by the 
due da teo 
A t any time the les:see may purchas'e the improvements 
i 
belonging to the Orown... i When a property is valued for rent 
. ren.ewal or freeholding~ the value of the Orown's improve-
ments must be in total at least what they were at the 
1. The unimproved value is defined in the. Valuation of Land 
Act 1951.. 
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cemmencement of the lease~ This condition is included 
because the lessee is expected to maintain the improve-
ments belonging to the Crown... In pract-ice, if the total 
value of the Crown I s improvement-s as assessed by the 
valuer, is less than that amount at the beginn.ing of the 
lease the difference is made up .. 
The lessee has the right to purchase the rental value 
at any time" The sum of (b) and (c) as-outlined above 
is determined at the time of freeholding and is the purchase 
price.. Freeholding can ibe carried out ei ther by payiri.g 
cash or' by a de'ferred payment licence ~ In~ the latter case 
the lessee must pay a deposit and the balance in the form 
of a table mortgage. In practi.ce this 'deposi t must be 
greater than fifteen per cent of" the p1ir~hase price. The 
initial rate of interest is five and ona half per cent for 
the deferred payment licence but is reviewed at five-yearly 
in.tervals .. 
Discharged servicemen if graded A,are entitled to 
lower rents.. The rental rate in this instance is three 
per cent as is the rate of interest payable on a deferred 
IlByment licence~ These concessions are restricted to certain 
rehtal values for sheep and dairy farms, above which the 
normal rental rate applies~ 
This is the framework of the Crown. Renewable lease 
system which has evolved through this century, and ub.der 
which the Crown. lets land to tenants .. 
PART II 
ON-FARM INVESTMENT 
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 
14 
15 
OHAPTER II 
THE EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES 
The evaluation of investment alternatives can be 
carried out f-rom various points of view. Olearly the 
nation, the Orown, and the lessee may have different 
objectives and hence place diff-erent emphases on. factors 
involved with an investment~ The investigation of invest-
ment 0ptions under Orown Renewable lease tenure is 
carried out with respect to the lessee, and the landlord 
as individuals 0 
Investment Decision Theory 
Fisher- (1930) recognised that investment is not an 
end in. itself, but is a vehicle by which consumption is 
balan.ced-over time o Investment options open to an 
individual cann.ot be evaluated separately from consumption 
alternatives 0 These two rela-c-ed factors have been con-
sidered by Hlrshleifer (1958,po332) who described them as 
production and financing deci'sions.. The production decision 
involves a choice of the investments which will permit the 
individual to attain his optimal intertemporal consumption 
pattern.. Oriteria such as net present value and internal 
16 
rate of return have been devised to assist in making this 
<iecision. 
The actual con~umption pattern is determined by the 
financing decision.. In this case -the individual decides 
whether to borrow or lend money in order to balance his 
consumption over time. This deoisi-ol1. depends on the 
individual~s intertemporal indifference curves and the 
investment opportunities open to' him. 1 The production 
decision cannot be made in isolation from the financing 
decision. 
The three criteria commonly used to make a choice 
between investments are outlined below. As the costs and 
returns generated by investments'are usually scheduled over 
some time period, these criteria e~bbdy the principles of 
compounding. and discounting as aescribed'by Fisher (1930) .. 
(a) Net Present Value 
(b) Benefit Cost Ratio 
(c) Internal Rate of Return 
(NPV) 
(B/C) 
(IRR) 
Lutz (1951) has pointed out that there is a problem 
in choosing the most appropriate cri terion. because, in the 
real world, disequilibrium conditions exist which can cause 
the criteria to give conflicting results. A considerable 
volume of literature has been written concerning the relative 
merits and demerits of these criteria. 
1 .. Hirshleifer's conclusions were ba'se"U ani the two-period case. 
Bailey (1959) demonstrated that these were also valid in the 
multi-period situation. 
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Although a full review is not contemplated it is necessary 
to emphasise those aspects of the criteria which are 
important from the point of view of this study~ 
The Net Present Value Criterion 
The net present value of an investment is computed 
as the sum of the discounted revenues and costs associated 
with that investment as given by Equation (3.]) where the 
1 bensfits and costs extend over k years. 
NPV ~ 
k ~ (R -C. )d j J=1 j J (3.1) 
Where Rj is the reven.ue in the jth year resulting~from the 
investment ari.d i is the discount rate~ 
Frorri·Tg:u~rtToh·"t3"~T) i tfollbws that the net present 
value of an investment can be obtained by subtracting the 
present value of costs from the present value of returns: 
k 
R.d j 
k 
C.d j NPV = L L (3~2) 
j=1 J j=1 J 
1. To clarify exposition the discount factor" 1 is 
defined as d throughout this study. (1+i) 
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A positive net present value at the appropriate dis~ 
count rate indicates that the investment being evaluated is 
profitable~ Hirshleifer (1958) has demonstrated that this 
rule may fail in the case of non-independent investments in 
an imperfect market. However, in this instance only the 
individual's utility map will enable the correct conclusion 
to be drawn" 
The net present value criterion is recognised by many 
writers as the most universally-correct rule to use in making 
production decisions. It is used extenBively in this study. 
The Benefit Cost Ratio 
Eckstein (19~) has described the way in which the 
bensfit-cost rat~o can be used to rank alternative invest-
ments. The benefits and costs can. be defined for the 
purpose of a general benefit-cost ratio as the discounted 
revenues and discounted costs respectively~ These can be 
calculated in various ways. ~ -A project is acceptable if, 
at a given discount rate, its benefit-cost ratio is greater 
than. one. This criterion is n.ot used ~n this study. 
1. Johnson (1968) discusses further this aspect of the 
benefit-cost ratio in 'Proceedings of a New Zealand Seminar 
in Project Evaluation in. Agriculture an,d Related Fields'; 
Lincoln College Agricultural Economics Research Unit bulletin, 
Number 48: p,132-137~ 
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The Internal Rate of Return 
This criterion has evolved from the concept that an 
investment has a rate of return which is a characteristic 
of that investment.. It is described by Boulding (1935) 
as being an internal rate, not one which is determined 
outside the project~ As it is obtained by equating the 
function which describes the net present value to zero and 
solving for the interest rate, it is that rate which will 
equate the present value of· costs and returns .. An 
investment project will be acceptable if its internal rate 
of return is greater than the relevant external rate of 
interest" There are a number of conceptual and theoretical 
problems·with this criterion Which are worthy of mention .. 
The internal rate of return is obtained by calculating 
the roots of a polynomial function" For this reason the 
criterion expresses all the characteristics of the roots of 
a polynomiaL. There are two theorems which are useful for 
determining the presence and number of roots in an equation .. 1 
The upper limit to the number of positive roots is given by 
DescarteS' Theorem of Signs.. This theorem proves that the 
number of positive roots cannot exceed the number of changes 
in sign of the equation coefficients" It is therefore 
1 .. These theorems are described by Turnbull (1952) .. 
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possible to have as many internal rates of return as there 
are changes in. sign of the cash flow ass·c)'cia ted with the 
investment" Sturm's Theorem enables the determin.ation of 
the nurnberof real roots within a specified range" For 
an internal rate of return to exist there must be at 
least one sign change in the cash flow, and where there 
is only onf) such change a unique interna.l rate of return 
can be fc:mnd .. 
As the internal rate of return is a characteristic 
of the investment it is independent of extern.al interest 
rates" The discoun.t rate, as expressed by the solving 
rate of in.terest, is constant between periods and there-
fore cannot take into account fluctuating interest rates. 
Hence this rule cannot consider the concept of time pre-
feren:ce even if it is known. via some future pattern of 
interest rates" 
The Discount Rate 
The' discount rate used by an individual in the net 
present value formula, or with which he cOmpares the inter-
nal rate of return, provides the link between production 
and finan.cing decisions" The criteria outlined previously 
all require some meaningful discount rate in order to 
determine the profitability of investments. This discount 
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rate is determined by financing decisions which are made 
by the individual" 
There are two prime determinants of market interest 
rates" The first is the time productivity of capital as a 
factor of production. The demand for investment capital 
will be higher the greater the economyfsan.ticipated 
marginal rate of capital growth, and this will be reflected 
in the interest rates" Interest rates are also affected 
by the time preference for capital as related to con.sumption, 
and therefore reflect the relationship between consumption 
in different periods.. In a perfect market these two factors 
are equated and determine a single interest rate. 
Individuals will have to pay this rate for borrowed funds 
and be paid this rate in return for lending money. Hence 
this interest rate would be used by individuals to evaluate 
investments" 
There is no unique interest rate in an imperfect 
market" From the individual's point of view the interest 
rates which do exist can be broadly divided into lending 
an.d borrowing rates.. Where an individual alters his 
consumption pattern by borrowing, the interest rate which 
he pays for borrowed funds is the correct discount rate for 
him to use;in investment evaluation .. It will be profitable 
for such an. individual to carry out investments with a 
positive net present value at the borrowing rate of interest 
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or any project whose internal rate of return is greater 
than this rate. Similarly, an individual who lends money 
in order to redistribute consumption over time will use 
the rate of interest earned by the funds which he has 
lent as the discount rate for the evaluation of productive· 
investments~ Hirshleifer (1958, p.334) has pointed out 
that in certain circumstances a rate between the borrowing 
and lending rate V\Tould be the correct one to use. This 
situation arises when investment is carried out to the 
point where no borrowing or lending is required to achieve 
an. optimal distribution of consumption over time. However 
this rate c.an be defined only by reference to the individual's 
utility map .. 
To use one rate of interest to evaluate investments 
implies tl:lat an individual can lend or borrow at that rate 
.. 
an amoIDl.t whieh will enable him to attain his desired 
intertemporal consumption pattern" 
The Financing.Decision 
Stewart (1968) has pointed out that an individual 
is ultimately concerned with the actual cash flow from an 
investment,,· If consumption is to be redistributed over 
time by borrowing then the actual consumption stream c~n 
be obtained by including in the revenues and expenses, 
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borrowing as a cash inflow and the debt-servicing expenses 
1 as outgoing charges. Consumption (Y j ) in year j would 
then be written: 2 
where 
-- (3.3) 
R. represents revenues genBrated by the investment 
J 
in year j .. 
C. represents costs generated by the investment in 
J 
year j ~ 
B. 
J 
represents borrowing in year j • 
P. 
J 
represents principal repayments in year j • 
I j represents interest payments in year j • 
Consumption in each year as described by Equation 
(3.3) can be incorporated in the net present value formula 
in the following way: 
k 
NPV = L 
j=1 
(3.4) 
1~ Hirshleifer (1958, p .. 332) has pointed out that borrowing 
by an individual to finance productive investment is 
modifying his inter temporal consumption pattern. 
2.. Th4-s model assumes that the investment is the only 
source of revenue for this individual .. 
.... , .. - ... 
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To ensure that the total principal repaid equals the amount 
borrowed over the planning horizon (k), the constraint 
can be added" 
-k 
LB. = 
j=1 J 
~ L- P. 
j=1 J 
Equation (3 .. 4) describes the net preSflnt value of an 
\ 
individual's consumption stream. Stewart (1968) noted that 
if the interest rate paid for the borrowed funds equals 
the discount rate, then the present value of the investment 
is unaffected by the method of borrowing or timing of 
loan funds" 1 It has already been menti'Oned that if borrow-
ing is carried out then the discount rate should be the 
interest rate paid for the borrowed money. Hence the 
inclusion of borrowing and repayment in the net present 
value formula will not affect the choice of investments. 
Fisher's (1930) analysis of the choice between income 
streams, which has been further elaborated by Hirshleifer 
(1958) emphasises the point that the net present value rule 
is useful only for production decision.s" The net present 
1 ". Jensen (1969, p. 263) has demonstrated that if the discount -
rate equals the interest rate paid for borrowed funds, 
Equation (3 .. 4) reduces to Equation (3.2) .. This analysis can 
be extended to include the situation where funds are lent 
and their lending rate equals the discou,n.t rate.. Neither 
the method nor the timing of the lending will affect the net 
present value of the investment .. 
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value,cri terion chooses the investments which generate 
income streams with the highest net present value. The 
consumption stream is determined by the individual's 
utility map and his opportunities for lending or borrow-
ing. The main failing of the net present value and internal 
rate of return rules is that they make only the product-
ive dE?cision, and give no indication. of the amount which 
should be borrowed or lent to enable the individual to 
attain his optimal consumption pattern. For this reason 
the net cash flows in the net present value formula should 
include on~y the costs and revenues generated by the 
investment" 
Uncertainty 
Expected values of prices and techn,ical coefficients 
form a substantial portion of the b~ase on which investment 
•• \ j,. 
decl.sl.ons are made" The criteria are therefore subject to 
the effect of uncertainty. 
Turvey (1963) has suggested three methods by which 
an allowance for uncertainty can be made : 
(a) in the calculation of annual costs and returns 
(b) in assumptions con.Oerning the -li£e of the 
investment 
(c) in the discount rate. 
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Each of these methods has characteristics peculiar 
to it, and none is un.iversally valid~ A useful way of 
exploring the effect of uncertainty is by parametising the 
most important unknown variables.. The range of results 
so determined permits more confidence to be placed in any 
conclusions which are drawn .. 
Farm Investment 
Most on-farm investment is characterised by costs 
and. returns extending over a number of years and is 
therefore usually termed continuous-input continuous-
output investment o The following discussion Tefers mainly 
to development, but the principles which are established 
apply to all on-farm investment decisions~ 
Derivation of Cash Flows 
Gow (1968) has pointed out that owing to the 
continuous nature of farm development and the comple:l( 
relationship between technical co-efficients on the farm, 
It has proved impossible to differentiate clearly between 
capital and maintenance expenditure 0 Hence the cash flow 
technique of isolating extra costs and extra revenues 
generated by farm development, is usually employed .. 
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This technique requires the establishment of a base, with 
which the net cash flows derived from the farm plus invest-
ment can be compared. A property which is a functioning 
entity oat the time alternative investments are contemplated, 
has a net cash flow related to its level of output, and. 
ruling prices and costs. The net present value of such a 
net cash flow can be written 
where R . and 0 . represent farm revenues and costs oJ oJ 
res,pectively in the jth year when no investment occurs. 1 
The present value of the net cash flows resulting 
from the farm plus investment can be written 
k 
NPV = L 
j=1 
(R . + R.)d j -
oJ J 
k 
L 
j=1 
(0. + O.)d j 
oJ J 
where R j and OJ are the extra costs and returns generated by 
the investment in the year j and incorporated in the farm's 
net income. Then the net present value from the investment 
is given by 
k 
NPV = I: 
j=1 
(R . + R.)d j 
oJ J 
k 
L (0 . + O. )d j 
j =1· 0 J J 
1" The method of discountin\g and compounding u.sed in thOis . i.-
study assumes that revenues and costs occur at the end of 
each year. 
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k 
.d j 
k 
C .d j L R - L 
j =1 oJ j=1 OJ 
k k 
R.d j C.d j = L L (3,,5) -;)--- J j=1 
I 
j=1 
From ECl_uation (3.5) it is clear that in determining 
the net present value of an investment by this. method the 
base should be calculated in. such a way that the extra 
costs and returns reflect only the effect of the invest-
ment~ The method by which a base with this characteristic 
can be established is described as the 'with and without' 
principle by Eckstein (1958)" To compare before and after 
situations may not be correct, as the after situation 
may include effects due to the changes in factors other 
than those caused by the investment" What should be 
compared is the progress of the farm with and without the 
investment~ Lawson (1967) exemplified this approach by 
the establishment of a moving base which took into 
consideration the lagged effect of previous investment,. 
Alchian (1955) has pointed out that with the 
adoption of the cash flow method of evaluation, the present 
values of two net income streams are being compared at 
some discount rate,. To set the net present value to zero 
and solve for the discount rate is to determine the interest 
rate at which the two income streams have the same present 
value.. Fisher (1930) called this the 'rate of return over 
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cost'. In the particular case when the base is zero, then 
only the investment is being discounted and the solving 
ra te of interes t for this will be the internal- ra te of 
return. 
A hypothetical development programme is illustrated 
in figure 10 1 The development programme extends from the 
base year ·~o the year in which the increased production 
which has been stirnulatl3d by the developmental inputs has 
stabilised. The pre-tax net income which describes the 
base is computed by deducting from the gross farm income 
all cash expenditure and depreciation. 2 In this instance 
cash expenditure does not include any reward to the owner's 
labour and management~ The base will be derived from 
physical input-output coefficients measured in the base 
year.3 Depreciation is included as an expense, for the 
base is assumed to be able to maintain' its level of pro-
duction to perpetuity. The net ca.sh flow over the 
developmen.t period for the farm plus development is cal-
I 
cula ted by subtracting the total cash expendi tilre from the -
gross farm income. Depreciation is not included as an 
1. The main elements in Figure 1 are described by R.W. 
Oartwright (1967,p.142) in his unpublished M.Agr.Sc. thesis 
entitled 'The Potential for Increased Production on Sheep 
Farms in Wairoa County'. 
2. The post-tax net cash flows are examined following a dis:-
cussion of the implications of taxation .. 
3 G,AI though the base is usually established on a 'status 
quo' basis with fixed technical coefficients, it can be cal-
c~lated as a moving base, as previously described. 
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expense because it is assumed to be incorporated in the 
expendi ture on capital items regarded as' development ex-
penses~ Interest payments in excess of those incurred in 
the base year are excluded from theexpenses. 1 The post-
development net cash flow is assumed to be able to be 
maintained'at this level to perpetuity and hence depreciation 
is included. as an expense. The pre-tax net income, des-
cribed in Figure 1 is given by the farm plus development 
net cash flow less the base net cash flow. In this way 
the extra revenues and extra costs of a development pro-
gramme are isolated~ 
The Effect of Taxation 
·Before an entrepreneur can dispose 6f the profits 
from the farm firm, they are modified by taxation. The 
taxation structure to which the firm's net profit is sub-
jected may therefore have a significant effect on the 
plans which will optimise intertemporal consumption. For 
this reason the profitability of farm investment from the 
national viewpoint may di:ffer from that of the individual. 
It is therefore pertinent to review the effect taxation 
may have on investment analysis from the individual's 
1. Mention has been made that the h.et present value cri terion 
is useful only in ~aking production decisions •. 
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point of view .. 
In any year tax payments are calculated frGm the level 
of net income~ Using the terminology described earlier the 
after-tax net present value can be expressed in the 
following way, when no developm,ent is carried out, 
k 
NPV = L 
j =1 
(R . ~ 0 . - T .)d j OJ oJ OJ 
and where T . is the tax paid in year J .. OJ 
The after-tax net present value of all. investment 
option can be written using the terminology described 
earlier, 
k 
NPV = L 
j=1 
(R. - O. - T.)d j 
J J J 
where T
J
. represents the tax payable in excess of T . and OJ 
caused by the investment. Tj may be positive or negative. 
As the individual faces a progressive tax structure, the 
extra tax paid is a function not only of the receipts an.d 
payments caused by the investment, but also of the absolute 
level of net income. Post-tax and pre-tax·nat present 
values are demonstrated in Figure 2~ 
The curves 00' and DD' in Figure 2 express the net 
present value pre-tax and post-tax respectively, of an 
investment as a function of the interest rate" As the 
+ 
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o 
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respective internal rates of return are given by the 
intersection of these curves with the horizon.tal axis, 
taxation has reduced by A the internal rate of return, 
in this hypothetical example. The vertical distance B 
describes the difference in present values between the 
pre-tax and post-tax income streams at a particular rate 
of interest o 1 
If it is assumed that the individual who carries 
out this investment borrows to redistribute his consump-
tion, ,then the borro",?"ing rate of interest should be used 
as the discount rate. From Hirshleifer(1958), the in-
dividual can transfer money from the future to the 
prese;nt by borrowing, the cost being given by the interest 
paid. In the pre-tax situation the interest paid is a 
linear function of the amount borrowed. 2 
The individual faces the same borrowing situation 
for the post-tax evaluation with one exception,. As' 
interest is tax-deductible the real interest payment, or 
reduction in consumption is a curvilinear functIon of the 
amoUl),t borrowed. The discount rate used in post-tax in-
vestment evaluation is therefere related to the marginal 
1 .. Documenta tien of practical ex!hlples may be seen in 'Then 
Impact of Taxation on the Profitability of Farm I>evelopment 
in. New Zealand' by R.W. Cartwright (1967). 
2 .. It has been assumed that the marginal cost of borrowing 
remains constant. 
, , 
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tax rate, anrl in practice may be much lower than the 
interest rate actually paid to the moneylender. In 
this study the discount rate used in post-tax investment 
evaluation is given by the reduction in the base net in-
come caused by the interest paid when $1 is borrowed. 1 
It is mean~ngful to evaluate alternatives after tax, 
only if they are all compared on the same basis. Invest-
ment options on the farm evaluated after'ta.x can only be 
compared with off-the-farm a.,lternatives if these also are 
considered in an after-tax framework. 
Lessees' consumption decisions are made on an after-
tax basis and to ignore this is unreal. This is especially 
true when the freeholding option is being considered as 
there is no capital gains tax. In this instance income 
streams must be compared, after tax, with an,y movefllent 
in land values which may benefit the lessee if he free-
holds. 
Consumption, Investment and Taxation 
The classical theory of investment evaluation re-
lates the choice of income streams to consumption decisions 
via the discount rate 8 In practice a further link is pro-
18 The ra tional~ for' adopting this discoun,t rate is dis;.. 
cussed in detail in Appendix IV. 
36 
vided by taxa~ion. Both consumption and investment de-
cisions influence taxation pa,yments and hence the amount 
available :for subsequent investment or personal drawings. 
Investments affect the amount of tax paid by generating 
extra costs and extra revenues. The consumption pattern 
decided on by an individual affects taxat'ion payments, 
because interest paid is tax-deduc:tible whereas interest 
received is taxable" 1 In contrast' to the pre-tax· 
situation wherein if the discoun.t rate equals the borrow-
ing rate the timing and amount of loan funds will not 
affect the net ~resent value o£ the investment, the post-
tax situation is affected by the finan.cing decision. In 
the past various methods have been employed in order to 
evaluate farm investment in an after-tax framework. 
The techniques reviewed below all use a base net 
cash flow with which the net cash flow derived from the 
farm plus investment is compared. Consumption (Y :) in 
oJ 
year :j which ,would have occurred had there been no in-
vestment can be defined as : 
1. Borrowed funds ~nd principal repayments do n.ot influence 
tax payments except through interest. 
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using the previously-established terminology" 1 If the 
assumption that no borrowing will take place without in-
vestment is made~ then Equation (3,,7) can be rewritten 
2 as~ 
' .. ,"" -
y . = R . 
oJ oJ 
c . 
oJ 
T . 
OJ (3.8) 
A method of post-tax investment evaluation described 
by Wright (1963) involves comparing a base net cash,flow 
as determined in Equation (3.8) with a consumption s-t+,eam 
generated by the farm plus investment. If the desired 
consumption pattern is attained by borrowing, then con-
sumption in the jth year of a farm plus investment 
situation can be written: 
y. = R. - c. + B. - P. - I. - T. 
J J J J J J J 
(3.9) 
The net present value of the investment option: is then 
calculated by: 
k 
NPV = L: 
J=I 
(Y. - y .)d j 
J oJ (3.10) 
1. The individual is assumed to redistribute his consump-
tion by borrowing. 
2.. Interest paymen,ts are assumed to be zero in. the ~I.'e­
develo'!pment situation .. 
, . . . 
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where (y .) is calculated from Equation (3~8).. 1 A point 
oJ 
which emerges is that if the series Yj - YojiS positive , 
for all j then the investment is obviously! profitable. 
This method of investment evaluation assumes a consumption 
pattern in order to determine the 'amount borrowed. The 
I 
net present value described by Equation (3.10) therefore 
embodies both consumption and production decisions. If 
the investment has been carried out, and the analysis is 
instigated completelYlon an; ex-post ~asis~ then the con~ 
l . 
sumption pattern is ktown. i The series of Yj for j equals 
1 through k then represents: the individual's actual draw-
ings in these years. However, even in ex-post analysis a 
consumption pattern has to be assumed for the base 'net 
cash flow~ The series of Yoj for j equals 1 through k 
used in Equation (3.10) assumes that this represents the 
:actual consumption pattern~ or if it is regarded as con-
sumable income, impli$s that the pattern 6f drawings is 
not aLtered by borrowing or lendi:n.g. 2 Carrying out post-
1" The net cash flow Yj for j equals 1,k is constrained to 
ensure that the amount borrowed equals the amount repaid. 
2. Both these assumptions are unrealistic" Friedman (1957) 
has shown that consum:ption in anyone year is not uniquely 
determined by the netlincome in that year. Hence it is 
not realistic to presUme that the base net inc0me will be 
consumed exactly in each year. Neither is it valid to assume 
that if the individual had chosen the base net income stream 
he would not have borrowed~ or lent to alter its distri-
bution over time. 
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tax investm.ent analysis by this method on an ex-ante basis, 
involves making the assumptions concerning the consumption 
pattern, about both the base and the 'with investment' net 
cash flows. 
Clearly a net cash flow incorporating borrowing and 
principal repayments will stabilise only after the loan 
funds have been repaid. This stabilisati-on year is des-
cribed in Figure 1 as payback. In 'the instance where a 
farmer repays a development loan by a table mortgage the 
net cash flow would not stabilise until the end of the 
mortgage.. To approximate this method of repayment in 
order to facilitate the analysis, by the adoption of-a 
shorter repayment period or a flat mortgage, would alter 
the net p:r;-esent value of the investment. The net present 
value will be affected not only by the amount which is 
borrowed but by the method of repayment. 
Cartwright (1967) has described a similar-method 
by which post-tax investment evaluation has been carried 
out. This technique computes the net pre'sent value as 
described in Equation (3.10), but excludes borrowing as 
an inflow and principal repayment as an outgoing charge. 
The net cash flow is then a series of Yjdefinedin the 
following way ~ . 
Y. ~ R. - C. - I. - T. 
J J J J J 
j=1,k (3.11) 
40 
Although such a net cash flow does not represent personal 
drawings it does assume a pattern, of consumRtion in. order 
to determine the interest payments.. Hence this method and 
the previous one make essentially the same assumptions. A 
net cash flow derived by the method described in Equation 
(3.11) is illustrated in Figure 1 as the post-tax cash 
profit .. 
A third method entails the exclusion of the financing 
decision from the analysis. The base net -cash flow is again 
determined by Equation (3.8L The farm plus investment 
net cash flow is given. by: 
Y. = R. 
J J 
c. - T. 
J J 
j=1,k (3 .. 12) 
The net present value as calculated by including Equations 
(3.12) and (3.8) for all k in Equation (3.10), is derived 
from the extra costs and returns generated by the invest-
ment itself and does not assume any arbitrary consumption 
pa-ttern.. This method includes the base and 'wi th invest-
ment t net cash flows as consumable income and n:ot "actual 
consumption streams. Although it is recognised that 
borrowing or lending will affect the net present value of 
the investment it is hypothesised that this method enables 
as realistic a, comparison of after-tax income streams as 
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the net present value rule will permit .. 1 It is obvious 
that the two former methods of after-tax investment 
evaluation reduce to the third if no borrowing is carried 
2 out. 
This study has used the latter technique.. The after-
tax net cash flow is defined as gross income less gross 
expenditure including depreciation., less taxation. 
Depreciation is not deducted from the 'with investment' 
net cash flow during the development period. 
1. Any d~viation from the consumption pattern assumed in 
the other methods will also affect their net present values. 
2. Consumption decisions will again affect the net present 
values of after-tax investment evaluation, and hence cause 
the three methods to give differing results, if· the individ-
ual lends to redistribute his con.sumption over time. 
CHAPTER III 
CROWN RENEWABLE LEASE TENURE 
AND FARM INVESTMENT 
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An entrepreneur leasing land under Crown. Renewable 
lease tenure pays an annual ~mount for the use of this 
resource~ The landlord receives payment for forgoing 
the employment of that resource in other uses. A basic 
premise to equitable leasing arrangements is that a 
profit-maximising firm exists from the point of view of 
both the landlord and the tenant. 
Most leasing agreements have evolved through time 
in response to forces such as competition and tradition, 
and can be divided broadly into two classes. Firstly, 
there are those for which the landlord and the tenant 
each con~ributes resources and receives a share of out-
put. These are called share leases being exemplified by 
shareruilking agreements.. As the landlord receives a share 
of output, rent is a marginal cost to the tenant. Heady 
(1952) has described the sources of conflict which may 
develop between landlord and tenant in this type of 
contract .. 
Crown. Renewable leases fall into the second class of 
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tenure agreements which involve a fixed ann.ual payment 
for the use of the resource by the tenant ~ .In the short 
run., a Crown Renewable lease is an example o_t a cash 
lease, wherein the rent is independent of pr,oq,uct mix and 
level of output. Hence, the rent does not enter the firm's 
marginal costs, but is incorporated in its fixed costs. The 
tenant is free to adopt any plan which will achieve his 
objectives and as this plan will not affect rent payments, 
the landlord will be indifferent to it. However, in the 
long run. the ann.ual rent instalment may not b!!l independent 
of the level of output. If the rent is related to the 
productivity of the land and the lease is renewed within 
the tenant I s time horizon the annual rent in,stalment may 
be some function of output, and therefore in the long run. 
the system may be a share lease. As the rent set for Crown. 
Renewable leases is based on. the price paid for unimproved 
land it is largely independent of the efforts of an 
individual lessee, and can be regarded as a cash lease. 1 
Rent Payments and Time 
Heady (1952) has pointed out that a tenant leasing 
land hires both flow and stock resource services and that 
1. This aspect is reviewed in more detail in Part III. 
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time is involved in leasing arrangements concerned with 
land. The time periods over which lease contracts run 
vary widely~ Although the majority of lease agreements 
are drawn. up for some longer period, a few are of one 
year's duration only.. The term of the lease has a- signi-
ficant effect on tenant plans.. If the objective of the 
tenant's firm is profit maximisation and the lease ex-
tends for one year only, then his objective will be to 
maximise profits in that year.. In contrast, the tenant 
with a Lease in Perpetuity has an unrestricted planning 
horizon as far as the lease is concerned. Whether or not 
the terms of the lease include the right of renewal is 
also important to the lessee, for if this is not the 
case his on-farm planning will be restricted to the lease 
period.. The greater security of tenure afforded by the 
right to renew the lease enables plann.ing to be exten.ded 
to the period the lessee expects to remain on the property. 
These factors emphasise the importance of time in 
the analysis of any lease system. From the tenant's 
viewpoint, the rent paid each year represen.ts a costin 
that year, and un.der Crown. Renewable lease tenure the 
lessee is confronted with a stream of these costs over the 
period he expects to lease the property. The present 
value of rent payments is given by the sum of the dis-
counted rental. instalments. 
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A ren,ewable lease system in which the rent is cal-
culated as a proportion of the rental value is outlined 
below .. 
t the period between lease renewals 
r t the rental rate 
i the discount rate 
Ro the initial rental value 
;0 the percentage annual change in rental value 
per year. Assumed to be consta;nt over the 
period. 
Rent calculated on the basis of this general lease system 
is given by Rort in the first year. At the end of each 
leas~ period the rent will change according to the change 
in rental value~ Then, if it is assumed that the rent 
payments occur at the end of each year and that at present 
the rent is being revised, the present value of rent 
payments (PVt ) over an unrestricted time horizon can be 
written: 
t 
dk 
(1 +,0 ) t t k PVt Rort L + Rort 
~
L = )t d + ••• k=1 (1 +i k=1 
t 
t··,·, .. 2t 
dk ~1 +~~ H !r~ 2t+~. • • " • • ) (4", 1 ) = Rort L (1 + 1 +i t + 
k=1 
2his can be extended to obtain the present value of 
rent payhnents when this gen:eral lease system persists for 
. d 1 n perla s,. 
This is given by 
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2 
Tenants leasing land under Crown. Renewable lease 
tenure have their rent reviewed every thirty-three' years. 
Half the annual rent is paid at the 'commencement of the 
lease and thereafter payments q>ccur at six-monthly 
intervals. The inclusion of these parameters in. Equation 
i 
(4 .. 1) enables the present value of rent payments to be 
calculated under the candi tions pertaining to Crown. Re-
newable lease tenure. In this instance 
t = 33 represents the number of years between rent 
renewals 
is the rental rate 
-R Ror33 = 2 is the half-yearly rental payment 
1 
i = (1+i)2 - 1 is the discount rate over a six 
month period equivalent' to i, the 
discount rate for a year. 
1. For the remainder of this study 1 +/3 is r~presented by A. 
1+1 
2 .. Equation (4 .. 1) can be modified to give this form because 
(14 At + A2t + ..... + A (n-1)t) is a geometric series and 
can. ,therefore be rewritten as G ~An.f]-- .. ". "~---.-.'." 
It=Itj' 
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Then the present value of rent paymen.tELfor a Crown. 
Renewable lease is given by : 
~ RAm [ 65 +L k~1 1J (-1 +1) J 
where n periods of the lease are being considered. 
Profitability from the Landlord's Point of View 
Time is involved in determining the return to the 
landlord. When he lets the resource he invests the rental 
value at that time in return for a stream of rent receipts 
into the future. As he owns the resource he also gains any 
asset increment or decrement which may occur owing to 
changes through time of the commun.i ty' s valua tionof that 
resource. The landlord can consume any asset increment 
by using it as security for borrowing or by selling the 
resource" 
The net present value of the costs and returns 
associated with own.ership of the resource is described 
below. 1 
(4.2) 
1. The' deri va tion of Equation (4.2) is contained in ,Appendix 
I. 
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Equation (4~2) employs the terminology used previously, 
and' assumes that the asset is s01d at the end of year n. 
The rent payments in Equation (4.2) are based on a rental 
system in which the rent is renewed annually. Hence, r1 
in this equation is the rental rate of the system in which 
the rent is revised every year. If this nst present value 
is positive at the discount rate on which the landlord's 
investment decisions are based, it will be worthwhile for 
him to own and let this resource. 
The equation describing the net present value from the 
landlord's standpoint is readily re-arranged to obtain an 
expression for the internal rate of return. It can be pre-
sented in the following way. 1 
In Equation (4.3) the internal rate of return from the land-
I 
lord ··'s point of view is described as a function of the 
annual rate of change in rental value, and of the rental 
rate of a renewable lease system in which the rent is re-
vised annually ~ As Equation (403) is a root of Equa ti.on. 
(4~2) this model holds regardless of the year in. which 
the landlord sells the property. When this internal 
1. The derivation of Equation (4.3) is contained in Appendix 
II. 
.... ,"-,. 
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rate of return is greater than the lan-dlord's relevant 
discount rate, then owning and letting the resource will 
be profitable to him~ 
Although Equation (4.3) expresses the rate 'of return 
to the landlprd, it is limited in that it assumes the rent 
is reviewed ann.ually" As r 1 can be expressed as a function 
of lease systems with longer renewal periods 'the model can 
be generalised" If the present values of rent payments 
associated with two leasing systems are equal then. they 
will reduce the nBt present value of the lessee's income 
stream equally. He will therefore be indifferent between 
the two systems, as the substitution of one for the other 
will not affect his inter temporal consumption.. Similarly, 
two receipt streams which have the same present values will 
be equally acceptable to the landlord. Obviously this pre-
sumes that all conditions pertaining to the leases other 
than the rental rate and the period between rent' renewals 
are the same for both systems. 
If there is to be no source of conflict b-etween ' 
lessee and lan.dlord each must regard the rental systems 
in question with impartiality. 1 Al though a Ilessee may 
be indifferent between two lease systems, on the basis 
of their present values, the landlord will be in the same 
1. For a lessee 'to be in.d1.fferent between various, lease, 
systems they must all be equally acceptable to him in an 
after-tax framework. Where the Crown is landlord tax con-
siderations are irrelevant from the landlord's point 0f view. 
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position only if the discount rate·oil. which he bases his 
investment decisions is the same as that of the lessee. 1 
It has been mentioned previously that there is only one 
interest rate in a perfect capital market, and that this 
rate would be used by landlords an.d tenants to evaluate 
investments. In this situation the landlord will be in-
different between lease systems which are equally 
acceptable to the lessee. In the imperfect market which 
exists in reality, there are a wide range of interest 
rates and only by·coincidence would the lessee and the 
landlord base their investment decisions on the same 
discount rate. If the discount rates used by the land-
lord and ,the lessee differ, then some compromise has to 
be reached in order to determine a rate acceptable to both. 
In :the instance where the landlord and tenan.t cannot agree 
they would have to resort to arbitration in order to 
determine some compromise discoun.t rate. 
The rental rate of an annually-revised lease system 
whi,ch will give the same present value of payments' as a 
system renewed every t years, can be expressed in the 
following way,,2 
1. It has been assumed that the landlord and lessee 
have the same expectation as to the future rate of 
change in ren.tal value. On an ex-post basis this rate 
of change will be known, and be the same for both lessee 
and landlord. 
2" For the justification of this conclusion see Appenaix 
III. 
51 
Given the lessee's an.d landlord's compromise discount 
rate, and expectation of the rate of change in rental 
value, they will be indifferent to a choice between a 
lease systeII\ renewed every t years .and one which is re-
newed a'l'l;nually if r 1 as calculated in Equation (4-.4) is 
used in the ann.ual renewal system. As the rate of change 
in rental value is included in Equation (4.4), r 1 is a 
long run. ccmcept. The time period over which it is cal-
culated must be sufficient to permit lease renewals and in 
this way express the effect of any changes in rental value. 
The internal rate of return from the landlord's point 
of view can now be completely described. The substitution 
of Equation (4.4) into Equation (4 .. 3) gives the fellowing 
expression for the internal rate of return. 
t 
dk r t L 
r k=1 +. ;0 (4.5) = t 
~ dk • (1 -w<')k-1 
The internal rate of return fr0m the landlord,'@.. stand-
point is thereiere described as a fUl1.ction of the annual 
rate of change in rental value, the 'i'arameters of a'system 
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in which the lease is renewed every t years, and the 
discount rate which is acceptable to both landlord and 
tenant. 
Profitability to the Crown of Renewable Lease Tenure 
The Crown. is treated only as a profit-taking firm 
with regard to its role as landlord. It therefore can 
employ the mode_l contained in Equation (4.5) to determine 
I 
the profitability to it of letting land under renewable 
lease tenure. The substitution of the parameters 
associated with Crown Renewable Lease tenure into 
Equation (4.5) will describe the internal rate of return 
to the Crown from this form of tenure. This is given by 
the following expression. 1 
33 k 
r33 ~d 
+ r = 33 d~ (1 +"c)k-1 L 
(4.6) 
k=1 
---~--
1. For convenience Equation (4.6) assmnes that the rent is 
paid at the end of each year. Equation (4.6) can be written 
as r33 E+ i:: (111) ;1 
k=1 .:J + 
1 
where r = (1+i)2 -1. This formula conforms precisely to the 
condi tions of Crown. Renewable leases. 
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As discussed previously, the rental rate of a system 
revised every year and determined by Equation (4.4) 
reflects the effect of alterations in rent owing to 
changes in rental value. For this reason, only lon.g run 
situations can be explored with this model in. relation to 
Crown Renewable lease tenure. 
The change in rental value is known when the 
J 
return to the landlord is calculated on an ex-post basis" 
Ex-ante analysis includes the change in rental value as 
an expectation" This does not invalidate the model but 
introduces uncertainty. 
The Profitability of Freeholding 
A tenant leasing land under Crown Renewable lease 
tenure can purchase the land and Crown improvements on 
it at any time" When the tenant applies to freehold 
the rental value 'is set by the Land Settlement Board. 1 
The lessee has to pay this rental value in order to 
freehold. If he does not concur with this value he can 
attempt t~ have it reduced by resorting to arbitration. 
Under the 1948 Land Act a lessee who does not freehold 
" 
1, The valuation to determine the rental value is carried 
out by the Valuation Department for the Land Settlement 
Board. 
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the propert;y within a specified time of being notified 
of the above valuation, cann.ot re-applyfor a period 
of five years. 
The purchase of the rental.value by the lessee 
is an investment which has costs and returns associated 
with it" These occur over varying periods and therefore 
time is again involved in the analysis. The p~o~itability 
of freeholding is relevant from the tenant's point of 
view, and therefore his plann~ng horizon is relevant 
to the analysis. 
The Perfect Market Situation 
In the long-run competitive equilibrium situation, 
each factor will be paid its marginal value product. 
The landlord will pay the costs associated with land 
and will receive its marginal value product as rent .. 
The cost associated with freeholding is the rental 
value which, under the assumed conditions, will be the 
discounted marginal value product of land. The gain 
from freeholding which is pertinent if the lessee does 
not include the sale of the property in his plans, can 
be represented by the rent payments between·the time, of 
freeholding and infinity .. 
55 
The net present value of the costs and returns attributable 
to freeholding is given by 
NPV = PV .... R t ,ct:J 0 
using the established terminology and where the rent is 
reviewed every t years_ 
Owing to the assumed conditions there will be one 
market rate of interest~ Clearly, as the rent equals the 
marginal value product of the rented resource, the present 
value of the freeholding option under these assumptions 
will be zero o The lessee will be indifferent between 
owning or renting the resource. 
The Imperfect Market Situation 
In theL'eal world a perfect market situation never 
exists and this creates problems which are -important from 
the lessee's viewpoint. 
Decisions made by the· lessee in the present- time 
period are based largely on what he expects to happen in 
the future. The uncertainty surrounding future occurrences 
will influence both his plans and his planning horizon. 
Individuals are confronted with various interest 
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rates which can be used tq:-eval'liatecourses of action .. 
A lessee may select one ·of a range of lending or borrow;... 
ing rates depending on which is. appropriate. 
The rent paid is unlikely to equal the -marginal 
value product of land.. The parameters of le.ase systems 
which have evolved largely through custom may not 
determine rent on the basis of land's productivity. Even 
if a competitive market situatio:l'l exist-ed, it. is not at 
all clear that the rent should equal the marginal value 
product of land. 1 
The benefits and costs which are attributable to 
the lessee from adopting the freeholding option vary 
according to his fu.ture plans.. If the lessee plans to 
sell the property at some future date, for example n 
years into the future, then the relevant ben$fits are 
given by the marke-t value (MVn) of the prQperty at that 
date and· the rent payments between the time of freeheld-
ing and the time of sale. Hence, if the property is sold 
at the end of the nth year, the present value of the 
benefits using the previous terminology, is given by 
PV = PV + MV dn t,n n 
1,. This aspect is further discussed in Part III. 
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where the lease is renewed every t years. 
The costs associated with freeholdlng are given by 
the ren!tal value and the proportion of the market value 
which would have been paid to the lessee at the time the 
property was sold if it had remained leasehold. The 
present value of these costs is given by ; 
PV = Ro +o<MV dn n 
where 0< is the proportion of, the market value which the 
lessee would have received ha-d the property not been free-
holded. 1 The net present value of the freeholding option 
where the property is to be sold at the end of the nth 
year is given by the following. 
NPV = PV t - R + (1 - o() MV d n . ' ,n 0 n (4.7) 
The relevant discount rate is that which is appropriate 
fbI' the~lesseeto use in the evaluation of his investment 
options. 
The lessee may not include selling the property in 
his future plans. This is often the case where the farmer 
1. If Pn -is the price WhlCb: woUld"-'bEf" paid for a leasehold 
property in the year n, andMVn is the market value of that 
property if it was freehold in year n, then ip 
0<= n 
MVn 
• 
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hopes to retain the farm within the family. The benefits 
are then described by the present value of rent payments 
between the time of freeholding and infinity. The net 
present value of freeholding but not selling is given by 
the following; 
There are some indirect fact0rs associated with 
freeholding which may modify a tenant's outlooke The 
most important of these is the ability of the lessee to 
borrow moneYe He does not own. the land, and therefore 
cann.ot use it as security for a loan. Although in the 
short run. freeholding will not alter the lessee's equi ty 
position, it may alleviate the problem in the long run, 
especially if the value of the lan.d in.creases markedly. 
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OHAPTER IV 
A OASE STUDY 
Investment options open to a tenant farming a property 
under Orown Renewable lease tenure were investigated by means 
of a case study~ The farm, situated at Leamington, nine 
miles west 0f Oheviot, dates back to the break-up of the 
'Oheviot Hills' estate in 1893. 'Oheviot Hills' was a 
100,000 acre property which had been amassed by a William 
Robinson during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Gardner (1966) records that in 1885 the property ran the 
largest flock in New Zealand~ However, after the death of 
Robinson in 1889, when the estate was managed for the 
trustees, it de~eriorated rapidly. By 1893 it could'not 
meet its ann.ual commitments and was offered to the 
Government .. 1 The Liberal Government of the time recognised 
in this offer an opportunity for land reform and bought 
the esta-te.. 'Oheviot Hills' was subsequently divided intv 
smallEPr holdings which were made available to settlers~ 
i 
Thel-and was let under two forms of tenancy'.. Oue was 
Lease in. Perpetuity, and the other was the forerunner of 
1~ For a further discussion of 'the factors which motivated 
this sale, see Gardner (1966). 
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Crown Renewable lease tenure. The case study farm belongs 
to the latter category. 
Physical Description 
The property is a 952 acre hill country farm, divided 
into areas of 300 acres and 650 acres by a small permanent 
stream.. Approximately 150 acres are ploughable, and a 
further 250 'acres are able to be disc-ed" The remainder 
consists of gullies" The altitude varies between 600 and 
1350 feet above sea level. 
Although the rainfall is evenly spread with an average 
of 35~40 inches per year, the farm is subject to severe 
dry periods between November and March caused by strong 
north-west winds which are prevalen.t at that time of the 
year" The south-east faces and the deep gullies balance 
to some extent the north-west faces as they are less 
prone to dryin.g out" Theno~growth period persists for 
approximately two months durin.g the winter. 
Frengley (1965) records that the natural cover 
consisted of silver tussock (Poa caespitosa), some 
matagouri (Discaria toumatou), tutu (Corieria sarmentosa), 
and fern (pteridium esculentum) which was particular1y 
prevalent on the shady faces. At present there are few 
problem weeds on the property" The present cover consists 
of 
38 acres lucerne 
573 acres native and oversown areas 
58 acres greenfeed 
283 acres improved pasture 
€i1 
The Gower hill soils, which comprise most of the 
property are moderately fertile" The Amberley'soils, 
found on the flatte-r hill tops, are also fertile. In 
general the nutrient deficiencies are phosphate and sulphur. 
sheep 
I 
cattle 
The stock carried in the winter of 1970 were: 
1630 Corrie dale ewes 
760 ewe hoggets 
160 wether hoggets 
190 wethers 
33 rams 
76 cows 
20 two-year heifers 
42 yea-rling heifers 
1-1 yearling steers 
3 bulls 
The farm produces mainly fat lambs, wool and calves .. 
Some wether lambs are retained over the winter and sold in 
early spring. The wool is of good quality, and in the 
past 'has earned a large proportion of the property's total 
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income .. 
The cattle have been able to utilise the gullies, 
grazing the swamps in the bottom in the drier periods .. 
Until recently cattle and sheep have been complementary, 
but with the increased stock numbers they now comp~ete for 
the available grazing.. The policy has been to purchase 
young in=calf cows and to retain them for six or seven 
years .. 
There have been no major pest problems 'although 
increasing problems are being experienced with grass grub. 
The Tenant 
The lessee is fifty years of age and is married with 
five children.. He purchased a half interest in the property 
in 1947 and the remainder in 1949 from his father who had 
leased the property since 1919" Most of the lessee's 
farming experience has been gained on the property, as 
prior to 1947 he was employed in. the Navy.. He is a member 
of a Farm! Improvement Club, and is recognised as a skil-
ful manager.. This is demonstrated by the progress made 
on the property in recent years.. The lessee is keen to 
retain the property within the family .. 
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!]enure 
lhe 'land is held unaer Crown. Renewable lease tenure. 
!IThen the lease was renewed in 1959 it was converted from a 
twenty-one year lease to a thirty-three year 'renewable 
lease. On this' property the ren.tal value would be synonymous 
with the un.improved value if they were both estimated at 
the same da te. 1 
The present rental value of $16,150 was' de term'ined 
i 
two years prior to 1959. As the lessee is an ex-se~vice-
man, his present rent was calculated in the following way: 
Rent based on the rental value set in. 1938 
$9,310 at 3% $279.30 
Rent based ern. the increase -in. rental value be-'tween 1938 
and 1959 
$6,840'at 5t% - $376.20 
Les's r'ebate i% em $6,840 for prompt payment $34.20 
Annual rent payable - $621.30 
The future situation is complicated by the farmer's 
having purchased a half interest in the property in 1947 
and the remainder in 1949. As the concessions extend for 
33 years the rent willincrease-t0 $761 in 1;l80 and to 
-$807 . in 1982:', 'when. the lessee will be charged the full 
1. The relationship between these two values is discussed 
in Chapter I" 
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rental rate on the present ren.tal value. The lease rs 
renewable in 1992. 
Investment Opportun.i ties 
The on~farm investment options which concerned the 
lessee have been investigated in relation to two decision-
making years" In 1963 he was confronted with a range of 
alternatives not all of which could be carried out owing 
to his financ'ial restrictions. The three alternative 
courses of action open to the lessee in 1963 and examined 
in this study are: 
(a) to continue leasing and not to develop 
(b) to ccmtinue leasing and to develop 
(c) to freehold and not to develop 
The lessee chose to continue leasing and to develop. 
By 1969 the lessee had largely complete<:i .. the develop--
ment programme begun. in 1964, but still faced an array of 
inves'tment opportun.i ties. He was more concerne-d with the 
profi tabili ty of freeholding, as the un.improved value or 
rental value had increased rapidly in the more recent 
past. Between 1953 and 1968 the un.improved value grew at 
a compoun.d rate of 4.8 per cent per annum. This rate 
iner-eas'ed to 8 .. 6 per eent over the period 1963 to 1968. 
The net present value criterion is used to evaluate 
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investment altern.atives in 1963 ana 19690 Figure 3 outlines 
the timing of the alternative courses of action investigated 
in this study .. 
Development 
, i 
The lessee began a development programme in 1964/65~ 
Although he contemplated some further intensification, 
the pr0gramme was essentially finished by 1969/700 
The techn.iques of developing this class of hill country 
are well-lrn,own,. Cul ti va tion to provide winter fee d an.d to 
permit the renewal of pastures has been carried out. A 
feature of the programme has been the increased subdivision, 
directed at fencing off,the gullies from the tops and 
separating shady faces from sunn.y faces.. At the time of 
writing further fencing is contemplated .. 
Gully blocks have been overs own, with 41bs sub-
terran\3an clover per acre '. on. the sunn.y faces, and 41 bs 
wh'i te clover, 21bsBroad Red clover, and 11b Montgomery 
Red clover on the shady faces.. Cocksfoot was:plent'iful 
in the gullies prior to the development programme .. 
! The in.i tial fertiliser dreSSings consisted of 4cwt .. 
2-00 sulphur superphosphate per acre.. Maintenance has 
been provided by dressings of 3cwt .. sul,phuriSed super-
phosphate every second year. 
Schematic Representation of 
Investment Alternatives 
1963 1969 
Figure 3 
1980 
0"1 
0"1 
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As lucern.ecan be established readily on the 
Amberley soil type, increasing areas are being planted on 
the farm 0 This has meant tha tthere. is now a more certain 
source of hay, and that the property is less prone to the 
effects of drought, enabling the owner to approach higher 
carrying capacities with more confidence. 
Extension of access and improvements to the water 
supply have also been carried out. There are now vehicle 
tracks to most areas of the farm and this has already had 
a considerable effect on management, as the house, wQolshed, 
and yards are situated at one end of the property. In the 
Oheviot area a community water supply scheme is being con-
structed~ This is timely, as the area has been affected 
by drought over the las t two years and the w"a ter supply to 
paddocks has tended to dictate stock management over this 
period. The lessee is contributing to the cost of this 
scheme. 
The increase in carrying capacity over the development 
period is reflected in the growth in ewe equivalents per 
acre from 2 .. 1 to 3~5. The original development programme 
called for an increase in wether numbers. However, the 
fall in wool prices over the period, plus the unforeseen. 
incidence of pizzle rot forced this plan to be modified. 
Instead, the increase in stock numbers was largely com-
posed of ewes and cattle. 
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Permanent labour on the property is supplied by the 
lessee .. Although it-was envisaged that a second house 
would be built and a married couple employed, this has not 
proved necessary.. The labour supply is augmented by 
contract work and by emp-loying casual labour for jobs such 
as shearing and crutching. 
The original plan in:volved financing development out 
of ineome o Largely owing to the fall in wool prices in 
1964/65, the development programme could not be sustained 
without borrowing, and a loan to the extent of $13,800 
was raised from tbe State Advances Corporation. 
The Net Cash Flows 
The rationale behind the establishment of net cash 
i 
I 
flews used in the net present value formula, has been 
described~ It remains to outline the precise formulation 
of the net cash flows derived from the alternatives which 
have concerned the lessee .. 1 
A base was established. from 1963 to perl'etuity to 
enable the evaluation of alternative courses 'of action on 
the case study farm. The physical input-output 
coefficients for this base were derived from the product-
ion figures in the years 1962-1964. Any changes in these 
1. These alternatives are summarised in Figure 3. 
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coefficientswhieh have occurred between 1963 and 1970 
are assumed to result from the develo_pment programme. 
Although technical innovations may effect changes in 
these coefficients, this would be extremely difficult to 
measure and is more likely to be a benefit associated with 
development, as investment often provides the -opportunity-
for incorporating new technology. The base revenue for 
each year was calculated on the prices received in that 
1 year. The prices paid in each year of the development 
programme were adjusted from the base year of 1963/64 in 
response to changes in a cost index. 2 
The post-development budget has been established 
, 
for the 1969/70 year. This is an arbitrary cut-off point, 
as although the lessee does not intend to implement major 
investment expenditure in the near future, he does propose 
to carry out some further in.ten.sification~ However, de-
riving a status quo budget in this year p~r:mits the 
evaluation of the development actually carried out 8 For 
the post-development budget to represen.t faithfully the 
iwi>act of the development it must fully re!lect the in-
creased productivity generated by that investmentl' 
1. Constant-pr~ce~ w~re not l;lsed ~o evaluatedevelo~ment, 
ex-post, as th1S 1S 1n conir1ct w1th the concep-tof a base 
as d.escribed previously.. Constant price analysis in ex-
post iri.vestment evaluation. abstracts from the decision-
making environment which occurs over the development period. 
2. The cost index used ,,<as that compiled.by the Meat and 
Wool Boards' Economic Service. 
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Revenue and expenditure for 1909/70 were calculated on a 
status quo basis and this was used as the post-development 
budget. 
Where the freeholding option is being investigated, 
there are no adjustments to the net cash flow after the 
status quo budget in 1970. The cash surplus of this budget 
can then be capitalised in 1970. However, where the proper 
continues to be leased, adjustments are made to the cash 
surpluses in 1980, 1982 anrl 1992 in response to changes 
in rent. The budge·tted surplus is finally capitalised in 
1992. This assumes that changes in. rent payments beyond 
this date will have a minimal effect on the pet present 
value. 
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CHAPTER V 
CASE S~UDY RESULTS 
The case study approach was employed to permit the 
exploration of certain intra-farm courses of action within 
the framework of the Crown Renewable lease system.. This 
method of study enables the evaluation of alternatives on 
one property and for one set of objectives in more depth 
than could otherwise be contemplated.. The disadvantages 
associated with this approach become evident whenever an 
attempt is +nade to extrapolate the results from a case 
study to other farms. The subsequent analysis emphasises 
that the conclusions are dependent on such factors as the 
date of lease renewal and the lessee's time horizon.. As 
these will vary between farms, the conclusions obtained 
from a case study cannot be used directly to make decisions 
on an inter-farm basis~ 
The Lessee's Point of View 
The models and" criteria discussed previously were 
used to evaluate the alternatives confronting the lessee 
of the caSe study farm" These have been considered firstly 
on an ex-post basis as this permits an investigation of the 
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recent development programme and a comparison of' that 
course of action with freeholding.. Secondly, the past has 
been taken as given and the alternatives facing" the lessee 
in 1969/70 examined~ 
Although the events up to 1970 are known, those 
which will occur in the future are not.. Some of the more 
important 'Tariables have been parametised to enable the 
results to be interpreted over a range of future events .. 
The construction of the net cash flows has been described" 1 
The Profitability of Development 
The development programme which was i:g.i_~iated in 
1964 and concluded in 1'969 was investigated to ascertain 
its profitability to the lessee. This is measured by the 
net present value at June 1963 of the extra costs and 
I 
extra revenues attributable to investment on the f~rm·. 
The net cash flows which describe these costs an.d revenues 
are contained in Table 2 .. 
The net present values described in Figure' 4 assume 
that the prices ruling in 1969/70 will continue into 
perpetuity and that the rent will not be changed in 1992 .. 
If the rental value increases at the same rate with and 
1 .. The methodology involved in determining the relevant 
net' cash flows is o~tlined in Chapter II.. The construct-
ion of the base is described in Chapter IV .. 
63/64- 64/65 
Pre-tax 0 -4420 
Post-tax 0 -3473 
63/64 64/65 
Pre-tax 0 -4420 
Post-tax 0 -3473 
TABLE 2 
Additional costs and returns from development 
(Actual Prices) 
65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 80/81 82/83 
-10345 -119 112 1466 6741 6741 6741 
-8476 1483 398 870 2630 2651 2672 
TABLE 3 
Additional costs and returns from development 
(Reduced Prices) 
65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 80/81 82/83 
-10345 -119 112 1466 5669 5669 5669 
-8476 1483 398 870 2808 2839 2868 
1992 
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1992 
5669 
2868 
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\.N 
N.P.V. 
at 
June 
1963 
The Net Presen.t Value of Development 
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without development, then this will not afi'ectthe pre..;.,tax 
net present values o However, owing to the progressive tax 
structure Jthe after-tax net present values will be affected 
even if the respective rent payments change by the same 
amount. 
The development programme has been extremely pro-
fi table, as the net pres'ent values are posi ti ve over a 
wide range of interest rates, both before and after tax. 
There are several factors which have contributed to the 
I 
success of this developmento As the lessee's standard of 
management has been high; per head stock performance has 
not suffered under the stress of increased stock numbers. 
During'B69 the Cheviot area was subjected to a severe 
drought and stock performances were lower than normal on 
most farms" Although this occurred on the case study 
property, the lessee c0:r:l.siders that the consequences would 
have been more severe had he not developed~·1 As there were 
no lumpy i:nputs such as buildings included in the programme, 
the pr'Ofitability of the programme as ~ whole would be 
overstated by the f'orgoing result if investment of this 
type had to be carried out in the near future.. However, 
this is not the case~ ~other factor wll!-(Jllmay have ai'i'ected 
1. The post..;..developmentbudget was based on average per head 
stock performances, and n.ot those which occurred in the 
drought year" 
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the profitability of the programme, was a change in product 
mix. If the lessee responded to relative price changes 
between forms of output, say, sheep and cattle, then the 
base as calculated would n.ot represent a true 'without' 
situation. This was found to be unimportant as the 
property's classes of livestock have remained relatively 
constant over the development period. Figure 5 demonstrates 
this point .. 
The profi tabili ty of the programme impl-eme'nted by the 
lessee ,was also investigated under a lower price regime. 
The prices received up to 1969/70 were not changed as these 
have actually occurred, but the prices of all output ex-
cept wool were lowered by 20 per cent, from the post-
developmen:t year to perpetuity. The wool price was not 
changed as the 1969/70 price was the lowest the lessee 
had received over the last decade. The net cash flows 
associated with this chan.ge in prices are contain.ed in 
Table 3, while the pre- an.d post-tax net pr"esent values 
are illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 demonstrates that the development has been 
extremely worthwhile both pre- and post-tax, even under a 
lower pri'ce structure. The net present values are positive 
in both instances over the appropriate ranges of discount 
rates. 
The levelling effect that a progressive taxation 
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system has on the fluctuation in post-tax cash surpluses 
is indica ted by a compariSon of thes'e surpluses in Tables 
2 and 3.. Although the pre-tax net cash flows fall when. the 
price falls, the post-tax cash flows increase slightly. 
This occurs because the with-development income stream 
is taxed at a much higher rate than is the base income 
stream.. Hence, in this instance, the fall in revenue has 
reduced the after-tax cash surpluses of the with-develop-
ment situation at a slower rate than those of the base. 
Freeholding in 1963 
The two aspects of this altern.ativewhich concern.ed 
the lessee were firstly, whether or not freeholding was 
worthwhile at all, and secondly, whether or not it com-
pared. favourably with farm developmen.t. The net cash 
flows relevant to the evaluation of freeholding in 1963 
are contained in Table 4. Freeholdin.g at this date assumes 
that the lessee pays $18,000 as a lUIllp sum in 1963. 1 
The' farmer is not contemplating selling altd hence the 
benefits are expressed by the rental payments to perpetuity. 
Where leasing is continued, adjustments are made to the 
net cash flows for changes in rent payments which occur in 
1. The unimproved value of t~e property in 1963 was 
$18,000. 
TABLE 4 
After Tax Net Revenues 
(1969/70 prices) 
Annual rate of Year increase in 
rental value 
(percent) 63/64 64/65 65/66 66/67 67/68 68/69 69/70 80/81 82/83 1992 
-
Freeholded 1963. Not developed 
-11 ,541 .5428 6237 5701 5075 5023 5610 5610 5610 5610 
Leasehold. Not developed 
10 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 -6939 
8 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 -1050 
6.5 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 1740 
5 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 3295 
3 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 4383 
0 6249 5095 6007 5404 4732 4674 5274 5222 5170 5170 
Leasehold. Developed 
10 6249 1622 -2469 6887 5130 5544 7904 7873 7842 -198 
8 6249 1622 ,;..2469 6887 5130 5544 7904 7873 7842 4679 
6.5 6249 1622 -2469 6887 5130 5544 7904 7873 7842 6177 
5 6249 1622 -2469 6887 5130 5544 7904 7873 7842 6878 
- en 3 6249 1622 -2469 6887 '5130 5544 7904 7873 7842 7411 0 
0 6249 1622 -2469 6887 5130 5544 ·7904 7873 7842 7842 
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the years 1980, 1982, an.d 1992. The net cash flows in 
Table 4 assume that the price regime described by 1969/70 
prices continues on to perpetuity. 
The comparison between freeholding, developing, and 
maintaining the status quo from 1963 is illustrated in 
Figure 7. The net present values in this diagram have 
been computed from the net cash flows contained in Table 
4 at a discoun.t rate of 5 per cent. 1 The expected annual 
rate of change in rental value over the period 1963/1992 
has a strong influence on the relative merits of the 
al ternative courses of action.. As a con.sequence the n.et 
present values have been expressed as a function of this 
variable. 2 
In Figure 7 the differen.ce between. the various options 
at an expected rate of change in rental value expresses 
their relative profitability. These comparisons suggest 
that development has been the most profitable course of 
action.. Only if the rate of change in rental value is 
greater tlran. 9 per cent wou.ld it have paid the lessee to 
freehold rather than develop. The third option of retaining 
the status quo is inferior to development and is less 
1: The derivation of the post-tax discount rate is des-
crlbed in Appendix IV.. The interest~rate on borrowed funds 
has been included at 7 per cent and the marginal tax rate 
used to -calculate the 5 per cent discoun.t rate is that 
appropriate to the base net income in 1963/64. 
2 .. This section assumes that the rate of increase in rental 
value is independent of whether or not the lessee develops. 
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profitable than freeholding where the ann.ual gain. in rental 
value is greater than 4 per cent~ 
As uncertainty is reflected in unknown future prices 
and costs, it is pertinsnt to investigate the relative 
profi tabili ty of these al ternati"Ves un.der a different 
price structure. The net cash flows in Table 5 are cal-
culated in the same way as those in Table 4 except that 
output prices, excluding that of wool, have been reduced 
by 20 per cent from 1969/70 to perpetuity. The net 
present values of these net cash flows are expressed in 
Figure 8. Again the net present values are strongly in-
fluenced by expected changes in the rental value, under 
the leasing system~ Figure 8 confirms the conclusions 
drawn. earlier. The net present value of the development 
programme is greater than that_of freeholding or maintain-
ing the status quo ever a wiciie ran.ge of rates of change in 
rental value. 
Freeholding in 1969 
I 
I 
i 
The'development programme had been completed by 1969 
and the l®ssee was concerned wit~"~h~ ~reeholding alternat-
ive. ~his section assumes that the lessee does not in.-
clude selling the property in his future plans. Table 6 
describes t~e net cash flows associated with freeholding, 
Comparison in 1963 of Freeholding, 
Leasing and Developing (Reduced Prices) .. 
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TABLE 5 
After 'Tax Net Revenues 
(Reduced Prices) 
Year 
1969/70 1980/81 1982/83 
Freeholded 1963. Not deyeloped. 
4493 4493 4493 
Leasehold. Not developed" 
8 4090 4027 3967 
6.5 4090 4027 3967 
5 4090 4027 3967 
3 4090 4027 3967 
0 4090 4027 3967 
Leasehold. Develop-ed. 
8 6898. 6866 6835 
6.5 6898 6866 6835 
5 6898 6866 6835 
3 6898 6866 6835 
0 6898 6866 6835 
The net cash flows in the years 1963/64 to 
inclusive are the same as those ·in Table 4. 
85 
1992 
4493 
-2990 
-194 
1689 
3023 
3967 
2552 
4544 
5623 
6371 
6835 
1968/69 
Annual rate of 
Gain in Rental 
Value (Percent) 
TABLE 6 
After Tax Net Revenues 
(1969/70 Prices) 
Year 
1969/70 1980/81 
Freeholded 1969 
-20519 7941 
1982/83 
7941 
Leasehold. With development 
10 7735 . 7704 7674 
8 7735 7704 7674 
6.5 7735 7704 7674 
5 7735 7704 7674 
3 7735 7704 7674 
0 7735 7704 7674 
Leasehold. Without development 
10 5274 5222 5170 
8 5274 5222 5170 
6 .. 5 5274 5222 5170 
5 5274 5222 5170 
3 5274 5222 5170 
0 5274 5222 5170 
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1992 
7941 
831 
4378 
5703 
6470 
7007 
7674 
-5400 
-1019 
1288 
2780 
3929 
5170 
87 
leasing plus the past developmen.t programme, and the 
maintenance of the status quo from 1963.. These net cash 
flows are constructed in the way previously described. 1 
The freeholding price is assumed to be $28,460 or the un.-
improved value as determined in 1968.. Figure 9 expresses 
the net present values, at a discoun.t rate of three per 
cent, of the above ne t cash flows as a fun.ction of the 
expected ann.ual rate of change in ren.tal value between 
1969 and 1992 .. 2 
The net present value of the freeholding option in 
1969 was greater than that of maintaining the status quo 
if the expected rate of increase in rental value is 
greater than 5 per cent. If no investment had been 
carried out from 1963 onwards, then the net present value 
of the income stream is shown to be much lower than that 
of the other two alternatives. 
Table 7 includes net cash flows based on· the same 
parameters as those in Table 6 but with the price of all 
output except that of wool, reduced by 20 per cent from 
1969 to perpetuity. The effect of this is reflected in. 
Figure 10. 
1. The· after-development net cash flows have included 
the interest paid in 1969/70, as this year is the base for 
this section. The without-development n.et cash flow 
assumes that the same interest is paid in 1969/70 as that 
which was paid in 1963. 
~. In the calculation of this discoun.t rate the marginal 
taJd rate used was that appropriate to the after-
development net revenue in 1969/70. 
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TABLE 7 
After ~ax Net Revenues 
(Reduced Prices) 
Years 
Gain in Rental 1969/70 19~0/81 1982/83 
(Percent) Value 
Freeholded 1969 
-21692 6768 6768 
Leasehold, with development 
8 6742 6692 6662 
6.5 6742 6692 6662 
5 6742 6692 6662 
3 6742 6692 6662 
0 6742 6692 6662 
Leasehold, without development 
8 4090 4027 3967 
6.5 4090 4027 3967 
5 4090 4027·· 3967 
3 4090 4027 3967 
0 4090 4027 3967 
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1992 
6768 
2577 
3856 
4975 
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6662 
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This confirms the same general conclusions arrived at 
previouslyo If the rate of change in rental value is 
expected to be greater than 5 per cent, then the lessee 
should freehold$ The low net present value which results 
from maintaining the 1963 status quo situation describes 
the plight the lessee would have been in had he not 
developed" 
Freeholding in 1969 and Selling in 1980 
The assumption that the lessee did not intend to 
sell the property is relaxed in this section and an 
arbitrary date of sale, 1980, has been assumed. The model 
expressed in Equation (4 .. 7) is used to determine whether 
or not a substantial gain would accrue to the lessee if 
he freeholded in 1969 with the objective of selling in 
1980" The gain from freeholding would be the rent 
payments to 1980$ He would also gain the market value of 
the property in 1980 .. The cost in 1969 is given by the 
rental value, which for this analysis is assumed to be 
$28,460, or the un.improved value set in 1968. 
The net present value at June 1969 associated with 
freeholding at 1969/70 prices is given by : 
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Freeholding in 1969 and Selling in 1980. 
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( 1 +i) 11_1 MV 
i+(1-OC) 1111 
mI) 
where MV11 is the price received for the property in 1980 
and ex is the proportion of MV 11 the lessee would be paid 
if the property was leasehold~ Then at a discount rate 
of 3 per centg 
NPV = 
MV 11 
-28,460 + 6,590 + (i-G<) 
1.384 
• 
Al though MV 11 and 0< are unknowns in this equation, it is 
possible to express the relationship between them. This 
is shown in Figure 11 where the market price of the 
property in 1980 is expressed as a function of the pro-
portion of the market price which the lessee would 
receive if the property was still leased at that date. 
This relationship describes the break-even point for free-
holding from the lessee r s standpoint. If for any given: 
o<the expected market price falls on or above the line 
in Figure 11, then it would pay the lessee to freehold 
even if he planned to sell in 1980. 
From Figure 11, if the property could be sold in. 
1980 for $68,390 then freeholding would be profitable if 
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1 ~was less than .58.. Many consider that the prices paid 
for leasehold properties have often approximated the prices 
they would have realised if they were freehold. 2 In this 
instance 0<. approaches 1. If this occurred in 1980 free-
holding in 1969 and selling in 1980 is unlikely to be pro-
fitable. 
The Crown's Point of View 
The Crown is considered only in its role as a pro-
fit-taking firm and policy implications are not reviewed~ 
Although the Crown has owned the land associated 
with the case study farm since 1-893, the area included 
in this lease has been changed pe+,iodically. These changes 
have been small but have aftected the rental value at the 
date they occurred.. The last modification of the area was 
in 1937, and it is from this date that the profitability 
- of owning the present case study farm can be investigated 
from the landlor{i's point of'view~ 
The rental value in 1937 was $ 9,310. In 1968 it 
can be assumed to be $28,460, or the unimproved value in 
that year. This change in rental value represents a growth 
rate of 3.6 per cent per annum. The model as described by 
1. The capital value of the property estimated by the 
Valuation Department in 1968 .. 
2 .. An example of this is provided by Eville (1967,p.135). 
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Equation (4.6) is used to determine the return to the 
Crown" This is given by 
r = .033 + .036 
1 at a diseou:':1.t rate, of 7 per cent" This has been the 
internal rate of return to the Crown from owning and 
letting the property between 1937 and 1968,. As the 
lessee hasi been farming the property since 1949, it is 
possible to gain some indication of the profitability to 
the Crown over his tenancy by investigating the change 
in unimproved value between 1953 and 1968. The annual 
rate of growth in.-unimproved value or rental value has 
been·:4.8 per cent over this period" 2 The return to the 
Crown"" oV/er this time has therefore been 7,. 6 per cent,. 
It is necessary to consider the external interest 
rates to which the Crown is subject before the profit-
ability of! owning land can be assessed" These rates of 
return which' have been calculated from the·· Crown.' s point 
of view are greater than the interest rates on mortgages 
1. It has been established that 7 per cent is the discount 
.rate on which the lessee should base his investment de-
C1Slons.. Thfs discount rate is also assumed to be accept-
able to the Crown. At a discount rate of 3 per cent the 
\ return to the Crown would fall to 6" 5 per cent" 
2" The, 1948 unimproved value could not be obtained o 
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over the last decade; as the opportunity cost of funds to 
the Crown is unlikely to exceed these, its ownership of 
this are"a of land has been profitable. 1 
Conclusions 
The c.evelopment programme carried out by the lessee 
between 1963 and 1969 has been extremely profitable. 
Although freeholding in 1963 is likely to be more pro-
fitable than maintain~ng the status quo, it would be al-
most certainly less profitable than the development pro-
gramme which has. been carried out. Freeholding in 1969 
is likely to be beneficial financially to the lessee if 
he does not sell the prope·rty ip. the near future, and if 
the rental rate increases at a rate of five per cent or 
more per annUlD between 1969 and 1992.. As previously 
mentioned, the comparison of the freeholding arrd develop-
men.t options assu,mes that any change in rental value, 
and hence rent, is independent of development. Part III 
of this study examines whether or not Cr,own Renewable 
I 
leases are cash leases and discusses their effect on 
tenant plans. 
The Crown's investment in this property from 1937 to 
1. Dr.R .. W.M. John'S~n (1970) Principal Research EcoTn.omistat 
the Lincol!,!. College Agricultural Economics Research Unit, 
pers.comm .. 
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1968 has been profitable. 
These results have been obtained from within the 
framework of the present Crown Renewable lease system. 
Although the models derived to evaluate alternatives in 
this case study can be used in a study of any leasehold 
farm, the conclusions obtained are dependent on factors 
peculiar to the case study farm, and therefore cann.ot 
be applied directly to other properties. 
98 
PART III 
CROWN RENEWABLE LEASE TENURE 
AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
99 
CHAPTER VI 
THE THEORY OF RENT 
Throughout history rent has been influenced by 
tradition and political considerations. Although the 
wealth of a nation is directly affected by the efficiency 
of resource allocation, the processes which stimulate this 
allotment are often modified in response to other sociol-
ogical goals. It is pertinsnt to examine the effect of 
Crown, Renewable lease tenure on resource allocation, as 
its implications are important to the community. The 
theory of rent is a convenient starting point. 
Economic Rent 
The term 'rent' is commonly used to define a payment 
made periodically for the hire of goods. It need not be 
restricted to the instalments paid for the hire of land, 
but applies to all goods which are leased. In economic 
theory the term rent is applied only to payments made for 
any factor of production whose, supply is not perfectly 
elastic. Robinson (1969) des6ribes the concept of econDmic 
rent as the notion of a surplus earned by a particular 
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factor of production over and above the minimum earnings 
necessary to induce it to:do its work. Rent in common 
parlance th~refore, may include economic -rent p-lus pay-
ment for other items related to the maintenance of that 
1 productive factor in its employment. 
Rent is not peculiar to land as it may also be 
earnsd by the other broad factor categories; labour, 
capi tal and entrepreneurship. This has be-en painted out 
by Robinson (1969) who outlines the example of capital 
often earning a surplus, or rent, 'over the reward needed 
to induce many individuals to' save. Rent however, can 
only exist for those factors not in perfectly elastic 
supply. 
Scarcity and Rent 
Ricardo (1817) recognised that rent accrued to land 
because it is essentially fixed in area. In Figure 12, 
which has been described by Samuelson (1961,p.594), the 
completely i,nelastic supply curve for land is shown as 
SS' • To simplify the discussion! land in -this instance 
/ 
is taken to be of homogeneous quality in the production of 
one form of output. As DD' is the total demand curve for 
1. Econ.omic rent I,is referred to as rent for the remainder 
of thiS) chapter. 
Rent 
of 
Land 
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land, it represents the addition of the demand curves of 
all the individual firms" The demand and supply curves 
intersect at the equilibrium point Eo The rent of land 
will tend towards the factor-price defined by this 
equilibrium point. 1 If the rent was above this level some 
-land owners would be unable to rent all or a proportion 
(Yf their land,an.d hen.ce they would offer their land for 
less, bidding down. the rents. If the rents fell below the 
equilibrium factor-price the bidding of unsatisfied firms 
would ensure that rent rose. As land does not require 
any payment to be in existence, the whole of the payment 
made for land is rent. 
From Figure 12 it is clear that as the supply of 
land is unresponsive to price, changes in the level of 
rent offered for land will be brought about by shifts in 
the demand curve for land.. If in Figure 12 the price of 
output was to fall, then the demand curve for land would 
shift downwards to the left .. Rents would then fall to a 
new equilibrium level .. All factors which influence the 
demand for land will affect the rent paid for land. 
Rent exists only for factors p.ot in perfectly elastic 
supply. Returning to Figure 12, it is eviden.t that if the 
1. A competitive market in which there are no monopoly or 
monopsony elements has been assumed .. 
\ 
\. 
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supply of land was perfectly elastic no rent would be paid 
for land. 1 
Samuelson (1961) has noted that in the above example 
land earns rent; firstly, because its total supply is 
perfectly inelastic, and secondly, because the land has no 
other use to which it can be put. In order to consider 
further the ramifications of rent it is necessary to 
examine this latter point in detail. 
The Point of View 
From a commun.ity's poin.t of view the total supply of 
land is fixed and it requires no payment to remain in 
existence.. For this reason the whole of the reward to land 
is regarded as rent by the community. 
The necessary- minimum payment for a factor, from an 
industry's point of view, is not that which is required to 
keep the factor in existence. It is that payment which 
will retain it within that particular industry rather than 
in another. The price necessary to retain a unit of a 
factor within a certain industry is called its transfer 
earnings, as a payment below this would cause it to shift 
elsewhere to obtain a higher reward. A unit of a factor 
1. No payment is required to ensure l~nd's existence. 
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receiving its transfer payment exactly is teLrmed a 
marginal unit? for a slightly lower reward would encourage 
it to shift to another industry. An. intra-marginal unit is 
the term given to un.i t of a factor receiving earnings which 
are greater than its transfer earnings. Robinson (1969) 
has emphasised that when the supply of a factor is being 
considered from a particular industry's viewpoint,~~the 
total supply of that factor is not important. The relevant 
consd.deration is the level of earnings which will induce 
units of the factor to transfer themselves from other uses 
to the industry in question.. If institutional constraints 
are ignored, and the demand for a 'commodity increases, 
then the industry making the commodity will want to expand. 
The industry can obtain as much of a factor as required 
in a perfectly competitive market by paying it slightly 
more than its transfer earnings. Hence, a factor may be 
in perfectly inelastic supply in total, but may be in 
perfectly elastic supply to each use considered separately. 
From the point of view of each in.dustry the factor can 
receive its transfer earnings an.d not earn rent. 
There may be some produc·tivefactors which earn more 
in the industry in which they are employed than. their 
~transfer earnings. The difference between their transfer 
earnings and actual earnings in that industry can be re-
garded as rent from the point of view of that 
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ind us try. 1 
The reason for the different ways the community and 
individual industries regard rent have been outlin.ed by 
Samuelson (1961,p.597). To all. industry using relatively 
little of a factor, the factor-'price is all. important 
determinant of that industry's commodityprice. 2 To the 
economy as a whole, however, the rent of a factor in 
inelastic supply results from the prices of commodities 
which need quantities of that factor for their manufacture. 
Although the payments made for land are rent from the 
communi ty' s pOin,t of view, they are merely payments for a 
factor of production from all. industry's point of view. 
Differential Rent 
Although rent can be earned only by a factor of 
production whose supply is not perfectly elastic, the 
level of rent is influenced by the technical consideration 
that un,i ts of a productive factor may have greater or lesser 
production advantages. This section is again confined to 
\ 
the rent of land, although principleB involved apply to 
other factors in imperfectly elastic supply. 
1 .. An example of this is given by Robinson (1969, p .. 105) .. 
2.. The factor-price is all. element of the supply curve 
of that inrlustry's output .. 
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The firm whose cost curves are described in Figure 13 
is assumed to use one scarce factor only, that of fertile 
land" Figure 14 describes the costs and returns of a firm 
employing land of low fertility" In each cas,e AC is the 
average cost of the output of the firm excluding any pay-
ment made for" land, but i:p,cl udiIlg normal profi ts to 
1 management and capital employed with the land. MC 
represents the marginal cost curve. Both firms produce 
to the point where marginal cost equals price AO. The 
intra-marginal firm earns the surplus 'profit ADCB in 
Figure 13, ana. as land is the only scarce factor, this 
2 represents the rent of land" This firm can afford to 
pay up to this amoun.t for the use of land and still make 
normal profits" The firm employing the less productive 
, 
land has a total Jfevenue of AFEO in Figure'14, and total 
·costs of AFEO'and therefore is earning no surplus profits" 
This firm is said to be on the margin of CUltivation 
where it can only just afford to operate provided no rent 
need be paid for the use of land,,' This demonBtrates that 
land of differing fertility will earn different levels 
of rent" This differential rent arises essentially be-
1. The concept of 'normal profits has been described by 
Samuelson (1961) as profits being determined competit-
ively everywhere in industries of similar riskiness" 
2 .. The surplus profits-Al),CB, in this instance represent 
Marshall t s (1920, p. 811 )"-producer t s surplus" 
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cause the marginal value product of different types of land~ 
given the employment of other productive factors, will 
differ~ There is obviously a hierarchy of rents attribut-
able to different types of land, decreasing as the land 
becomes less productive o 
Differences,in the location of areas of land will 
also cause differences in the rents they earn even if 
they have the same inherent fertilityo It has been 
shown. that ultimately the rent of land is determined by 
the price paid by consumers for the product of land, and 
the firm's costs. The proximity of land to a market will 
affect the production costs of a firm in that situation, 
and therefore influence the rent which can be ·paid. Those 
firms close to a market can obviously afford to pay more 
rent than those further away 0 
Quasi-rent 
There are some factors of production which are not 
fixed in supply as land is, but whose supply i's inelastic 
in the short run. and elastic in the long run o Manmade 
\' 
factors such as machinery fall into this categoryo In the 
short run the supply of a machine may be fixed owing to 
kn.owledge of its production process, or the time it takes 
to be constructed.. However, in the long run its supply 
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may be perfectly elastic.. The quasi-rent earned by a 
machine whose supply is inelastic only in the short run 
is defined by Ston,ier and Hague (1964, p.293) to be 'its 
total short run receipts less the total east of hiring the 
variable factors used with it and of keeping the machine 
in running order in the short run'. 
Figure 15, also described by Ston~er and Hague 
(1964), can be used to illustrate quasi-rent. An entre-
preneur hires a machine for which he pays a fixed annual 
amount. By using this fixed factor with certain variable 
factors he earns a profit which varies ,with changes in 
demand and cost.. If the assumption is made that the 
machine is the only fixed factor, and labour the only 
variable factor, then'the total receipts less the total 
wage bill is the quasi-rent earned by the machine. In 
the Figure 15 the firm faces the average revenue curve PD" 
Total wages are TSMO. The rental of the machine is LQST. 
The quasi-rent is given by PRST o In this instance the 
machine is earning an abnormally high quasi-rent, In the 
long run the number of machines can be increased and the 
high quasi-rent competed away.. If the demand curve fell 
to l"D' the quasi-rent P'R'S'T' being earned would be 
less than the rental of the machine as L'Q'S'T' equals 
LQST. The' 'quasi-ren.t earned by the machine is now ab-
normally low and would not be sufficient to cover the 
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rental.. In the long run. the number of machines would fall 
and the quasi-rent would return to the normal position. 
Marshall (1920,p .. 424) has pointed out that the 
expectation of quasi-rents from a machine' is a necessary 
condition for the construction of that machine. For the 
builders of a machine will compare the cost of construct-
ion with the sum of the expected quasi-rents discounted to 
the date of construction, in order to ascertain whether 
or not it will be profitable for them to build the 
machine .. 
From the previous definition of quasi-rent it is 
clear tha t some short run. earnings of machine swill 
represent maintenance costs and not quasi-rents from the 
point of view of both individual industries and the 
economy" However, from an industry's point of view all 
factors of production may have transfer earnings" From a 
single industry's viewpoint, quasi-rent is the excess 
earned by a factor in inelastic supply in the short run. 
over and above its transfer earnings.. Hence, the quasi-
rent earned by a factor may differ according to whether it 
is estimated from the commun.i ty's or individual industry's 
point of view. 
Quasi-rent is not confined to inanimate capital 
goods" Stonier and Hague (1964) have shown that some 
human beings may also earn quasi-rent where the ability 
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they possess is inelastic in supply in the short runG 
Rent A Summary 
A productive factor whose supply is perfectly in-
elastic will earn rent from the community's viewpoint" 
However, a factor in perfectly elastic supply will not 
earn rent? Between these two E;}xtremes factors earn quasi-
rent because they are in imperfectly elastic supply in the 
short run." 
The effect of product demand on rent has been dis-
cussed. However, the rent earned by a factor will also 
vary in response to changes in the productivity of in-
dividual firms. From Figure 13 it is obvious that if the 
total cost per un.i t of output falls, rent will increase .. 
In this way technical inn.ovations will influence rent. 
From one industry's point of view changes in the 
factors affecting rent may influence other industries, and 
hence alter the transfer earnings faced by the former 
industry. As the demand for a factor increases a particular 
industry will have to pay increa.sing amounts to lure it away 
from other uses.. The increasing transfer payments will re-
duce the rent earned by this factor in. any ind.ustry if the 
I 
price of output of that industry remains constant. 
An individual firm may have to hire one or more 
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scarce productive factors. Although the firm can retain 
its factors of production by paying them their transfer 
earnings, surplus profits may remain.. The distribution 
of a firm's total value product among its productive 
factors is examined in Chapter VII" 
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CHAPTER VII 
RENT AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
The objective of an enterprise in which resources 
are combined to produce output is assumed to be that of 
maximising profits. According to marginal analysis this 
can be achiev~d by organ~sing resources on the basis of 
their contribution to total revenue and their respective 
market prices. Rent paid for land is a factor-price from 
the tenant's point of view, and hence it will influence 
decisions concerning resource allocation on leasehold 
properties. 1 Heady (1952, pp.402-406) has demonstrated 
that problems exist when attempts are made to allocate 
the total value pr0duct from a firm among its productive 
factors. This- process is termed resource valuation and 
is- impartant, for if a resource's contribution to total 
, 
revenue is $st-imated incorrectly it may lead to a mis-
allocation of res.ources through the mechanism of marginal 
analysis. The main problem is described by Heady (1952) 
as the conflict between valuing each resource according 
to its productivity, and valuing resources by the process 
of residual imputation. This chapter examines both 
1 ~ -Ren~tiri' tp..ts chapter refers to the payment made for the 
hire of a productive factor and does not describe economic 
rent. 
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methods of resource valuation. with particular emphasis 
on the valuation of land and its effect on tenant plans. 
Rent and the Productivity of Land 
Marginal analysis involves valuing resources according to 
their prod1.lctivi ty, or more specifically, on the basis of 
their marginal value products.. It is useful to examine 
whether or not economic theory permits the division of 
a firm's total product among its productive factors 
according to their respective marginal valueproducts~ 
The principle behind this apportionment is con-
tained in Euler's theorem which states that if each factor 
is imputed its marginal value product, then under certain 
conditions the total value product will be exactly ex-
hausted~ The condition 1lll.der which this proposition is 
valid exists when output from the fi;rm can be explained 
in terms of the inputs by a production function which is 
homogeneous of degree one .. This is-readily demonstrated .. 
Durell and Robson (1963) have shown that if output Q is 
produced from three inputs x 1 ,x2 ' x3 in. terms of a 
homogeneous function of the nth degree as 
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Then, 
As the partial derivatives with respect to each input re-
present their respective marginal products, total physical 
product will be exactly exhausted by imputing to each 
factor its marginal product when the-function is 
homogeneous of degree one.. This can be extended to total 
value product by multiplying through by the price of output. 
PQn = (7. 1 ) 
If n equals one and each factor is imputed its marginal 
value product, total value product will be exhausted 
1 exactly. The owner of each resource will be paid the 
marginal value product of that resource and there will be 
no unexplained surplus or deficit. 
If a production function is assumed to exhibit in-
creasing then decreasing returns, the exhaustion. of total 
product proposition will hold in the long run competitive 
equilibrium situation. The average cost curve is U-
shaped, and at the minimum cost position marginal cost 
1 .. The product of output price and the marginal product of 
a resource describes its marginal ~alue product. 
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equals average cost. For small movements about this 
position the conditions for a production function which is 
homogeneous of degree one will hold. In this hypothetical 
situation the marginal value product of each factor will 
equal its price, and if each resource is paid its marginal 
value product~ total value product will be exactly exhausted, 
It is obvious from Equation (7.1) that if n is nDt 
equal to one, then there may remain a surplus or deficit 
of total value product after each factor has been paid its 
marginal value product" A production function which is 
homogeneous of a degree greater than one exhibits in-
creasing returns~ If in this instance each factor is re-
warded with its marginal value product, the resultant 
figure will be greater than the total value of output. 
Conversely, if the production function's degree of homo-
geneity is less than one, and each resource is imputed its 
marginal value product, the total product will not be ex-
hausted" When the degree of homogeneity of the production 
function is other than one, the 'exhaustion of product' 
proposition cannot apply, and there is no basiscby which 
the remaining surplus or deficit can be allocated to any 
resource. When resources are valued on the basis of their 
productivity, total product will be "exactly exhausted only 
if the output from the firm, produced by the resources, 
can be explained in terms of a production function which 
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is homogeneous of degree one" 
Rent and the Marginal.Value Product of Land 
Rent is here regarded as tl\.e payment made by a 
tenant for land~ The relationship between land's factor-
price, rent, and the marginal value product of lan.d is 
examined to ascertain whether suoh a relationship, should 
exist" If it did, it would provide some guide to the 
desirable level of rent, given the marginal value product 
of!f.and • 
A firm whose objective is to maximise prof'its will 
base resource organisation on the cost of these factors and 
their respective marginal value products" In the long run 
under perfect lrn.owledge and pompeti tion, the prices, or 
costs, of all resources will equal their marginal value 
products" This is the general equilibrium situation where= 
in each firm is making normal profits and each :factor is 
paid its marginal value product" Rent will equal the 
marginal value product of land, if it is leased, and the 
landlord will pay the costs associated with maintaining 
it at this level of productivity" However, this is a 
purely hypothetical situation devised by economis~s to 
explore inter-relationshi;ps within an economic system" 
Conclusions derived from such a model have to be modified 
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in response to conditions which exist in the real world. 
The market price of a resource whose supply is fixed 
in the short run is irrelevant for short run productive 
decisions. Also, if a factor is not perfectly divisible 
it may be difficult to attain a situation where its 
marginal value product equals its price in the short run" 
The :;Jerfect competition assumption is extremely 
restrictive" Samuelson (1961) defines it as meaning that 
each seller has no control over prices. As this requires 
that the demand curve facing each seller is perfectly 
elastic, this is obviously an abstra'ction from the real 
world. Farms are one of the few types of firms which can 
raise or lower prices and gain or lose all the customers in 
the market" Monopoly elements exemplify the most obvious 
deviations from the conditions which are assumed to exist 
under perfect competition. A firm or group of firms 
capable of influencing prices will try to maximise profits 
nDt only by efficient resource allocation but also by 
control of the price of output" Those firms will generally 
aim to continue making surplus prof~ts and will not usually 
attempt to employ each resource to the point where marginal 
value product equals price. 
The assumption of perfect knowleedge is also violated 
in the·real world" As future events are not known with 
certain~y, decisions are based on expected occurrences~ 
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Frices and technology are both subject to uncertainty and 
it is thus highly improbable that a firm will produce to the 
point where the marginal value product of each resource 
equals its price~ 
The forgoing discussion assumes that all firms have the 
objective of profit maximisation and that they act in a 
rational manner towards this end" This too is an abstraction 
from reality~ Those firms which have other objectives may 
not employ productive factors according to marginal analysis .. 
Resource use in these firms is unlikely to proceed in the 
direction of equating the marginal value product of each 
re-source with its price .. 
For these reasons the marginal value product of 
resources under the conditions which exist in the everyday 
world will equal their respective prices only by coincidence .. 
In such an environment there is no rationale to-insist that 
the rent paid for land should equal its marginal value 
product.. Nevertheless, as rent represents land's factor-
price from the tenant's point of view, its relationship with 
the marginal value product of land may have considerable 
practical importance in decisions concerned with the 
allocation of resources on the farm~ 
Compensation for Unexploited Resources 
The owner-occupier's objective of maximising 
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con.sumption over time can be assumed to be analogous with 
that of the tenant" Hence? they will both respond to 
economic forces and allocate resources according to their 
cost and value productivity" Planning over the tenant's 
0r owner-occupier's time horizon enables on-farm investment 
alternatives to be considered" The terms of leasing 
contracts will affect tenant plans and consequently the 
allocation of the tenant's resources over time" The 
stated objective of the owner~occupier is consistent with 
the communityVs goal of efficient resource allocation in 
a competitive market" Hence? any deviation in the tenan.t's 
plans from what he would have carried out as an owner-
occupier will lead to a less efficient allocation of 
resources from the community's viewpoint" A lease system 
should ensure that tenants implement plans as if they own 
the properties which they in fact lease" 
The tenant will carry out on-farm investment to the 
same extent as an owner-occupier if he expects to gain the 
full returns from it" The benefits from such investment 
implemented by the tenant may not be completely exhausted 
at'the time the lease expires" The lessee will face the 
same inter temporal production opportunities as the owner-
occupier if he receives full remuneration for the unex-
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hausted portion of the returns on the investment he has 
initiated. Heady (1952) has noted that some lease systems 
permit the tenant to be paid a proportion of the cost of 
investments at the end of the lease and that this does 
not maintain the production opportun.i ties in a manner which 
would exist if the property was farmed by an owner-
occupiero The lease system should permit compensation to 
be determined by the value productivity of the unexhausted 
portion of the investment 9 discounted to the date at which 
the tenant relinquishes the lease 0 This w-ill usually be 
greater than the cost of the investments if they have been 
profitable o 
It will be profitable for the tenant to carry out 
investments whose net present value of costs and returns is 
positive at the discount rate appropriate for his invest-
ment decisions o He may therefore still carry out invest= 
ment although, owing to the form of compensation, it may 
be less profitable to him than it would be to an owner-
occupier. However, there are two main reasons why the 
form of compensation may affect the 'amoun.t of on-farm in-
vestment carried out by the lesseeo Firstly, at the margin, 
where investment is only just profitable to the owner-
occupier, it may be un.profi table to the tenant if the 
method of compensation reduces the benefits of the invest-
ment to the tenant 0 In this instance the tenant will not 
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carry out the investment which he would have implemented 
had he own.ed the property. Secondly, as farmers are con-
fronted with a range of investment alternatives they will 
choose those that are most profitable to them. 1 Clearly, 
if the form of compensation is expected to reduce some of 
the financial benefits generated by on-farm investmen.t, 
it may alter the tenant's priorities concerning the pro-
jects he is willing to undertake$ It may lead him to 
invest in the projects in which inputs are fully trans-
formed into output within the period he expects to remain 
on the property, rather than long-term projects.. If 
compensation reduces the profitability of on.-farm invest-
ment from the tenant's point of view, then off-farm invest-
ments may become relatively more rewarding financially. 
This also may alter the tenant's investment plans from 
those he would have implemented had' he own.ed the property. 
Compensation may affect tenant investment plans in 
the way described above even. where'he has the right of 
renewal. This will occur if, at the time of"renewal, the 
rent is calculated in such a way that it reduc~s the 
profi tabili ty of the tenan.t' son-farm investmen.ts. A cash 
lease, where the rent is set independently of the individual 
tenant's productive decisions, may alleviate this problem. 
1. Investment analysis from an individual's point of view 
has been discussed in Chapter II. 
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The basis for advocating the discounted value 
productivity of unexploited resources to be paid to the 
tenant as compensation? in order to encourage efficient 
resource allocation, rests on the assumption that each 
entreprenBur's objective is to maximise profits. Those 
with other objectives will not respond to the 'profit' 
incentive and may not attempt to employ productive factors 
efficiently.. To examine this further it is necessary to 
return to the concept of economic rent. 
Economic Rent and the Firm 
The economic rent of land has already been described 
as originating from the forces of supply and demand for 
land. A firm's surplus profits which remain after total 
cost, excluding any payment for land, has been subtracted 
from the total revenue, represents economic rent. This 
has been described in Figure 13 as the area ABOD where 
the firm is producing at the maximum profit point and 
land is the only scarce factor. 
Those entrepreneurs purchasing land can afford to 
offer up to the present value of the expected ;economic 
rents as the purchase price of land and still be rewarded 
with their transfer earnings as well as making normal 
profits.. The tenant can afford to pay up to the economic 
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rent each year as the payment for land and still make normal 
profits~ However, if the tenant does pay the area ABOD in 
Figure 13 each year for land, then the factor land will be 
earning economic rent from the community's viewpoint but 
n.ot from the tenant's .. 
To impute all of a firm's surplus profits to land, 
as economic rent assumes that the other productive factors 
are in perfectly elastic supply. Nevertheless, a firm 
may employ more than one scarce factor. Management, for 
example, may earn quasi-rent over and above its transfer 
earnings.. Robinson (1969) has shown: that if land and 
management were a firm's only scarce factors and the tenant 
was charged rent on the basis of the economic rent of land 
then at the maximum profit point he would rece-ive surplus 
profits composed of the quasi-rent earned by management in 
excess of the transfer earnings of management. By imputing 
the total surplus to land, its factor-price would be 
composed of the rent earned by land and any abn.ormally high 
quasi-rents earned by other produ~tive factors. 
Heady (1952) has demonstrated that the residual 
imputation method of resource valuation entails deducting 
a firm's total costs, excluding any payment to the factor 
being valued, from its total revenue and regarding any 
remaining surplus as the value of that factor. This is 
essentially the process whereby the economic rent of land 
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is calculated. 
Composition of Total Costs 
If economic rent is paid for land then the c.omposi tion 
of total costs is important. In Figure 13 the averag~ cost 
curve AC must contain the maintenance cests of retaining 
each level of output. It will reward factors just enough 
to maintain their level of productivity and will include 
all fixed and variable costs. By the definition of economic 
rent, management will be included at its transfer earnings. 
The transfer earnings of other fixed facters on a farm 
are usually very low once the factors are in place, and 
the relevant cost is that required for their maintenance. 
An estimate of depreciation must also be included in the 
annual total costs. Similarly the transfer earnings of 
variable factors are reflected directly in their prices 
and are incorporated in the total costs accordingly.. This 
concept of transfer earnings is important as it as.sumes 
that the price paid for input items is a measure of their 
utility to other industries" It assumes that the prices 
paid are essential for these inputs to be employed on the 
farm rather than in other uses. 
It is clear that a component of total costs should 
be quasi-rent. It was evidenDed previously that in the 
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long run some quasi-rent was essential for the continued 
employment of a factor of production. The quasi-rent 
included in a firm's costs should be a normal rate of 
interest, or normal profits on the tenant's invested capital. 
The expectation and existence of some quasi-rent is 
necessary if the tenant is to be induced to pay maintenance 
costs and replace assets" 
A cash lease is one in which the rent does not enter 
the marginal cost of a tenant's firm. Economic rent falls 
within this category as it is independent of the firm's 
level of output. If the landlord claims the })roducer's 
surplus as rent the tenant will be rewarded with his 
transfer earniri.g~ plus normal profit on his investment. 
If however, the landlord pays the costs associated with 
maintain~ng the land at a level of productivity then the 
landlord can claim economic rent plus these costs. 
:.-
Level of Rent and Resource Allocation 
Although rent which is set independently of the level 
of output will enter the tenant's firm's fixed costs, it 
will influence his investment plans.. It is therefore 
worth examining the effect of the level of rent on the 
alloca tion of a ten-an t-, s resource s. 
In Figure 16 rent has been set at le.ss than the full 
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economic rent described previously. The total receipts 
earned by the firm are OADQ. The tenant pays OBCQ in 
costs, BFGC in rent and enjoys the surplus of" FADG. A 
tenant whose rent is set at this level does not have to 
increase output to the point Q in order to make normal 
profits. This is demonstrated by rearranging Figure 16. 
In Figure 17 the area BAKL represents the rerl.t and is 
.. 
the same as BFGC in Figure 16. It is obvious that the 
firm can earn norma.l profits by taking produc'tion to the 
point M. In Figure 17, if the tenant maximises profit 
by producing to the point Q he will earn surpluS profits 
as LKDC is equivalent to FADG in Figure 16.. Hence, a 
tenant may make normal profits without achieving the most 
efficient allocation of resources if the ren.t has been 
set lower than the full economic rent .. 
Figure 18 describes the situation wherein the rent 
has been set in excess of the true economic rent. The 
total reven.ue is again OADQ and total costs, -includ'ing 
rent, OFGQ. The firm's payments exceed receipts by AFGD, 
and as this occurs at the maximum "profit point Q, this 
loss cannot be reduced by altering the level of output. 
In the short run the tenant will continue to produce at 
point Q provided that the total revenue earn.ed exceeds th.e 
variable costs incurred in producing it .. For_if there was 
some surplus of revenue over variable expenses the firm 
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could contribute selUe payments to fi~ed factors whose 
expenses are always incurred in the short run., whethfrr 
or not any output is produced •. However, in the long run., 
where factors fixed in the short run. became variable, the 
firm would cease to operate. 
A monopolistic landlord would maximise profits by 
setting the rent as the true economic rent. At this 
level of rent the tenant will be paid his' transfer earnings 
and will be earning normal profits on his investment. 
From Figure 13 it is clear that if the firm produces at 
any point other than Q it will make a loss. A firm pro-
ducing less than Q would have to expand output in order 
to remain viable. In this way economic rent could be used 
by a monopolistic landlord to force all. efficient allocation 
of resources within the farm firm. Mention has already 
been made of forms of compensation which are necessary for 
a' tenant to move towards the maximum profit point. The 
necessary assumption for this waS that his objective 
involved maximising profits. However, if rent is based 
on economic rent it can be used to force tenants to the 
least cost position regardless of compensation or tenant 
objectives. 
To some extent this may also occur in a competitive 
market free from institutional con.straints. As Marshall 
. (1920) suggested, if rent was set competitively., as it 
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was in/Britain in the 1800s, at such a level that a 
'normal' tenant made zero profits, then those managers 
with superior "ability would earn quasi-rents.. Those 
whose management was inferior would make losses .. 
A monopolistic landlord who claims economic rent 
froin his tenants will set it on the basis of land's most 
profitable use and level of use. He would therefore 
have to be circumspect in determining the use to which 
the land is to'be put. Rent determined on the basis of 
a specialised use not available to all the firms for 
which the landlord sets the rent, may be vastly different 
from that which would force efficient resource 
organisation .. 
Using economic rent as the annual payment for the 
use of the land can be effective in stimulatiIl.g efficient 
resource allocation only if it is independent of the 
level of output .. If the rent .imposed is. determined by the 
output that!firm attains, it will n.either provide incentive 
nor force any increased output. Depending on how long 
the lag is, the ten.ant will always be making normal profits. 
This is exemplified by Figure 17. If in this diagram the 
I 
rent is determined on the basis of the output M, then the 
lessee will be earnin.g only normal·profits.. If however, he 
, " 
expands to Q' and the rent is again recomputed he will 
still be earning only normal pI.loflts.. In the real world 
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the tenant would be unlikely to expalll,d'output to Q if he 
expected to receive only normal profits on his extra in-
vestment" However, if economic rent was set independently 
of output he would have to expanrl to Q or make losses. 
A tenant's firm which is not producing at the 
maximum profit point would have to expand towards it if 
the rent was set as full economic rent. As'development 
cannot be carried out instantaneously the firm would make 
losses until it produced at the maximum profit point. The 
tenant could not avoid these losses by selling his interest 
in the property because the incoming tenant would reduce 
the purchase price by the sum of the losses he would 
expect to make, discounted to the date of purchase. 
The forgoing discussion assumes that the production 
function characteristic of each firm exhibits increasing 
then decreasing returns. Although production functions 
with degrees of homogeneity equal to or greater than one 
cannot reach an equilibrium least cost position in the 
long run, they may have U-shaped average total cost 
curves in the short run~ 
Economic Rent and the Payment for Land 
As land is not in perfectly elastic supply it earns 
economic rent, the level of which is determined by the 
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demand for land~ The payment made for land by firms, 
although regarded as economic rent by;the community, is 
payment for a productive factor from the fir.m's viewpoint. 
Only in the hypothetical, long run equilibrium 
situation will the price of each productive factor equal 
its marginal value product. Under the conditions 
existing in the real world, there is no reason why the 
rent of land sh"ould be equated with the marginal value 
product of land. However, a comparison of 'Prices of 
factors with their respective marginal value products 
may permit the efficiency of resource allocation to be 
examined, even if a strictly competitive framework 
does not exist~ 
It nnw remains to consider the principle followed 
by the Crown when setting rent under renewable lease 
tenure. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CROWN RENEWABLE LEASE 'TENURE AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
The Crown owns approximatel;t'-Ia third of the occupied 
-farm land in New Zealand and could therefore be regarded 
as a monopolistic landlord o This role is further 
emphasised by tne CroWE:' s being largely res-ponsible for 
devising the rules by which this land is administered .. 
However, in contrast to private monopoclists, the Crown 
wishes to encourage cefficient resource allocation 
thr0ughout the economy_ 
The effect of Crown. Renewable lease ··tenure on 
resource allocation is important from the nation's point 
of view.. Although this also concerns the tenant, he can 
modify his plans to achieve his objectives if he 
understands the ramifications of the lease system.. As 
thes-e plans may- not coincide with society-vs goal of 
efficien.t r~source allocation, it is necess'ary to 
inves"tigate this aspect of Crown. Renewable lease tenure .. 
The theory which has been reviewed in Chapters VI and VII 
is'used as the basis for this evaluation. 
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Rent Determined by the Crown Renewable Lease System 
At the time the lease is renewed four values are set 
by the Land Settlement Board. These have been documented 
in Chapter I as, the value of the improvements owned by 
the Crown, the value of the improvements owned by the 
lessee, the value of the land exclusive of improvements, 
and the capital value of the property~ The sum of the 
former three values cannot exceed the fourth. Land in 
this case is regarded as a resource providing services, 
to which the application of capital is termed improvements. 
Although this valuation is carried out under the auspices 
of the 1948 Land Act1 the following discussion assumes that 
the rental value does not include the value of the Crown's 
improvements, and hence is analogous to the unimproved 
value of land as determined by the Valuation of Land Act 
1951, at the date of rent renewal" 1 Consequently the tenant 
is presumed to own the improvements and the Crown the land" 
As the cap"i tal value is the estimated market value 
of the property at the time of valuation, it is based on 
1~ It has been pointed out in a research paper entitled 
'A Critical Study of Unimproved Land' 'prepared by the 
Valuation Department (1968) that these two values are 
synonymous in most instances" They may differ by reason 
of the definitions of improvements in the two Acts~ 
Although it is expedient to make this assumption, it is 
not necessary for the subsequent conclusions. 
, . 
f -_ 
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recent farm sales and therefore is the same, irrespective 
of which of the two Acts the valuation is being carried 
out under" As the sum of the unimproved value and the 
value of improvements must equal the capital value of the 
property under the Valuation of Land Act 1951 ~ the 
relationship between these three values can be written 1 
CV - VI + TN 
where CV~ VI9 and TN represent the capital value 9 value 
of improvementsy-and unimproved valuerespectively~ This 
can. be rewritten in terms of the 1948 Land Act under the 
assumed conditions as 
CV = VI + Ro 
where Ro is the rental value at the time of valuation" 
The method of splitting the capital value into the value 
of improvements anrl rental value is crucial to the effect 
of Crown Renewable l,ea.se tenure on resource allocation" 
1" Although this relationship is held to be valid by 
most valuers 9 and is generally implemen.ted in practice 9 
some confusion does exist o This is further discussed by 
MoBe Cooke (1967) in 'The New Zealand Valuer v 9 
Vol.,20, Nos o 2 and 3 9 PP 69~75o 
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Rent and the Price Paid for Undeveloped Land 
McVeagh (1952) defines the unimproved value of land 
as the price." which would be paid for land in its original 
state at the time of valuation. In this instance under the 
assUIiled conditions i·t is synonymous wi th the rental value 
and can be restated to be the price a block of land would 
command if offered for sale at the time of valuation and 
if no improvements had been carried out on ito If the 
rental value is determined on this basis 9 then rent under 
Crown Renewable lease tenure is set on the ·price paid for 
undeveloped land" 
The prime determinant of the price paid for farms is 
the expected future net income o A purchaser will pay up 
to the present value of the expected net income stream 
associated with a ~roperty~ Any modification of the 
expected net income stream will a.ffect the price~ Once the 
purchase has been completed 9 the farmer is free to 
implement his own plans which may include on,=farm invest= 
ment with the objective of augmenting farm income" 
ConsequentlY9 the price paid for a farm will reflect the 
level of output the purchaser expects to attain. To use 
the terminology previously established, prospective buyers 
can afford to bid up to the present value of the expected 
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producer's surpluses gen.erated by the property, an.d still 
make normal profits. In a competitive market the buyer who 
purchases the property will be that person. who expects to 
attain the highest producer's surpluses, given that factors 
such as discount rates are the same between individuals~ 
Although expected net income is not the only factor 
influencing the price paid for farm land~ it is not intended 
to review others, as Johnson (1970) has shown that expected 
net income, as approximated by the previous year's income, 
explains virtually all of the variation in prices paid for 
farm land in New Zealand in recent years~ 1 
Rent under Crown Renewable lease tenure is set as 5 
per cent of the rental value. If the rental value is 
determined by the price paid for undeveloped land, then 
the ren.t set for Crown. Renewable leases is consonant with 
the notion of economic rent~ In a competitive market the 
price paid for land will be sufficient to negate the 
expected future producer's surplus, otherwise the 
anticipated surplus profits would attract a higher price 
from other purchasers. As there are no improvements on 
unimproved land the price paid for it will be based on its 
discounted expected economic rent only~ Hence, by 
1~ Dr" RoWoMoJohnson, Principle Research Economist with 
the Agricultural Economics Research Unit l;l, t LinCQ1:n. 
College, unpublished research work (1970). 
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calculating the rent as a percentage of this price, the 
annual rent payment will approximate economic rent~ In 
practice, this annual rent instalment will be only a crude 
approximation of economic rent as it is affected by factors 
such as individual's varying expectations, discount rates, 
and whether or not a competitive market does exist for 
farm land" 
Rent un.der Today' s Conditions 
There are few areas in New Zealand remaining in their 
original undeveloped state o Certainly those which do exist 
are nDt sufficient to support a market for this type of 
land" 1 Consequently there is no base which valuers can use 
to establish the price paid for undeveloped land and hence 
ealculate un.improved value" 2 McVeagh (1952) has stated 
that for the statutes to be followed correctly, the value 
o~improvements, capital value and un.improved -falue should 
1) The lack of sales of un.developed blocks of land, an.d the 
co~sequent problems which confront valuers has been outlined 
inia research paper en~itled 'A Critical Study of the 
unimproved Value of Landt and prepared by the Valuation 
Department (1968)~ 
2. This has been recognised by the Valuation Department and 
an amendment to the Valuation of Land Act 1951 has recently 
been en.acted" This replaces un.improved value wi th land 
value for rating purposes.. These are not comparable as the 
land value includes items previously regarded as improvements" 
However, unimproved value or, un.der the conditions adopted 
previously, rental value, remains the basis for setting rent 
under Crown Renewable lease tenure" 
141 
be ascertained independently~ However, owing to the 
difficulty involved in estimating the unimproved value it 
has been accepted by the courts that the W'l.improved value 
can be determined as a residual~ 1 FirstlY9 capital value 
is estimated, then the value of improvements, which is 
deducted from the'former to give the unimproved value~2 
This is described in. the following way using terminology 
previously stated~ 
Ro = UV = OV - VI (8" 1 ) 
As the rent is set as a percen~age, r 33 , of the rental 
value, it can be written~ 
= (OV - VI)r33 
,T,he methodology adopted to determine the value of 
, , 
improv.e.ments and the capital value thus directly affects 
rent set under Orown. Renewable lease tenure" 
r:"--The acceptance of this principle is recorded in the 
case 'Valuer-General vs Sullivan' in the- 'Digest of the 
New Zealand Valuer'; second edition, pp 95-98" 
2 .. A recent exposition of this method is contained in 
the case 'Valuer-General vs W.J. Johnston and others' 
in the 'Digest of the New Zealand Valuer'; second 
edition, pp332-342~ . 
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The value of improvements as calculated by.the 
Valuation Department is closely related to their cost" 
Morris Jones (1967) made this clear when'he stated, 'It 
is doubtful whether un.der normal circUmstan.ces the value 
of an improvement can exceed its cost~ so replacement cost 
usually decides the ceiling to the value of any improvement, 
to informed persons in the land market' .. In practice the 
full cost is often not credited to improvements if the 
valuer concerned does not consider that they are being 
used to the best advantage at the time of valuation. 1 
The price paid for an improvement represents its value to 
society, and the farmer has to pay this price in order to 
attract it away from other uses. The'actual cost of an 
improvement is its transfer e~rnings,·the payment of which 
represents an investment from the farmer's-standpoint. 
Once the improvemen.tiff fixed in place on the farm the costs 
relevant to the farm firm are those associated with 
maintaining it at a certain level of productivity .. 
Cooke (1965) has explained that the capital value of 
a farm is based on the prices paid for similar properties 
in the surrounding district" It is an estimate of what 
the property would fetch if offered for sale at the time of 
1. This point is e_mphasised in YValua tion Problems 
Illustrated' by M~Bo Cooke, 1968. 
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valuation. 1 The total price paid for a farm will include 
payment for la;nd 1 -improvements, stock and plant. In bidding 
for the land plus improvements a purchaser can offer the 
present value of his expected future producer's surpluses, 
plus the normal profits earned by the improvements actually 
on the farm 0 Compet~tion between purchasers will ensure 
! 
that the sD-~cessful buyer will, given certain assumptions, 
have offered the highest discoun.ted economic rent for the 
lando 2 Hence 1 the prices on which the capital values are 
based will result fr,om the most profitable level of output 
! envisaged by prosped,tive purchasers. 
At the beginn.ln.g of each lease period, the rent is 
therefore ca:j..culated, as a percentage of the present value 
of some relatively profitable future level of value output, 
less all or a portion of the transfer earnings of the 
improyements in place on the farm" As the capital value, 
and hence the rental value, is based bn some'district 
figure, the rent set on each ,farm is therefore largely 
independent of individual tenant resource use" 
0on.sequently the Crown Renewable lease is a cash lease, and 
it attempts to draw off economic rent because it is based 
1" Not, all sales are' included, as the willing seller, 
willing buyer concept is taken into account. 
2~ The discount rates of ind.ividual buyers are assumed to 
be equal and it is also assumed that a competitive market 
exists for land, and 1 as noted in Chapter VII, a perfect 
market for the other factors, of production. 
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on the most profitable anticipated level of output and 
estimated transfer earnings of improvements .. 
Rent Determination~ An. Example 
The calculation. of rent under Or own. Renewable lease 
tenlU'e can be related to the previous discussion of 
economic rent.. The only difference between the five 
properties described in Table 8 is the amount of capital 
1 employed with land or the stage of development.. The 
changing producer's 'surplus which occurs from left to 
right indicates diminishing returns to increased 
applications of capital .. 
, The producer's surplus produced by farm one is 
$1500 .. 2 The prie.s-; which a purchas,er could Brfford to offer 
for the. property if he e:x;peeted to maintain. ita tits 
present level of productivity and be rewarded with his 
transfer earnings and normal profits on'his capital would 
1" This example is described' by B.P~-Philpott in a paper 
entitled 'Economic Efficiency in Agriculture' presented 
at a meeting of the New Zealand Institute of Agricultural 
Science, August 1961 .. 
2 .. The producer's 'Surplus is here defined as the total 
revenue produced by the farm less the total costs 
incurred in producing it, where these costs exclude any 
payment made for land, and include normal profits, in 
this instance assumed to be 5 per cent, on the capital 
employed with land.. Payment for productive factors ot:Q.er 
than land is therefore made on the basis of their transfer 
earnings .. 
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TABLE 8 
Producer's Surplus and Unimproved Value 
Farm No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Area (Acres) 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
Capital ($) 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 
Surplus ($) 2000 2829 3467 4000 4473 
Normal Profit on 
capital at 5% ($) 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 
Producer's surplus ($ ) 1500 1829 1967 2000 1973 
Ren.t at 5% on. UV$40,000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
be the capitalised producer's surplus plus $10,000 for the 
capital in. place on the farm. Assuming that the future is 
known. with certainty the prospective purchaser could offer 
$30,000 for the land at a discount rate of 5 per cent~ 
However, if a prospective purchaser expected to develop 
the property by injecting a further $30,000, the producer's 
surplus would rise to $2,000 0 If development could be 
carried out instantaneously then the purchaser could offer 
the capitalised value of $2,000, namely $40,000 at a 
discount rate of 5 per cent, for the land, and $10,000 for 
the capital in existence on the property~ Indeed, if a 
\ 
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competitive market for land is assumed, the purchaser will 
have to pay $40,000 plus the $10,000 capital for property 
ons. 1 Clearly, as '$2000 is the highest producer's surplus 
which can be obtained from any of the five properties, 
market forces would ensure that, regardless of which 
property is sold, $40,000 will be paid for the land. The 
unimproved or rental value of each propeTty is therefore 
From the above example it is possible to illustrate 
the method used in practice to estimate the unimproved 
value~ If it is assumed that of the capital employed 
with the land on farm one $5000 represents plant, stock and 
working capital, then the remaining $5000 can be regarded 
as the capital inve-stedin improvements on the farm. In 
this instance the capital value is given·· by the sale price 
of the land plus improvements. 2 The un.improved value or 
rental value is then calculated for farm one in the 
'. 
following way using the previously eStablished terminology: 
1. Not only does this assume a competitive market for land, 
but as previously noted, it assumes that the other 
productive factors are in perfectly elastic supply. 
2. The capital value is an estimate of the sale price of 
the land plus improvements at the date of valuation. In 
practice it need not exactly equal the sale price of a 
property, as sales are modified or excluded from analysi,s 
according to any special circumstances surrounding a 
sale. 
Ro = UV = CV - VI 
= $45,000 - $5000 
= $40,000 
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As the rental value or unimproved value is the same for 
each of the five properties so will be the rent determined 
under Crown Renewable lease tenure~ The rent is 
calculated as 5 per cent of the rental value, and in this 
instanDe is $2000~1 
In the real world such assumptions as perfect 
lmowledge, competitive market, and instantaneous 
development will, of cource, no longer hold. Nevertheless, 
this example illustrates that Crown Renewable leases are 
cash leases, and th~t they purport to set economic rent as 
the payment for land at the-date of lease renewal. 
Economic Rent and Crown. Renewable Lease Tenure 
The i~plications of insisting that tenants pay 
economic rent for land have been reviewed in Chapter VII. 
Its major effect is to force tenants to attain an efficient 
allocation of resources or -make losses. This can be 
illustrated within the framework of Crown Renewable lease 
1. If the rent is not paid by the due date i a per cent of 
the rental value is ad'ded to ito 
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tenure by means of the example described in Table 8. 
Clearly~, if the rent was set at the same' date for each 
farm at $2000, as it would be under Crown, Renewable lease 
tenure, all farms other than farm four would make losses" 
Farm four is the only one which would-reward the tenant 
with his transfer earn.ings and normal profits on his 
capital~ The tenants on the other farms would have to 
employ more or less capital to move towards this position, 
or accept earnings less than their transfer earnings .. 
The hypothetical example described by Table 8 also 
emphasises the importan.ce of the Crown Renewable lease 
system's accurately determining the rental value. 1 
Clearly, if this is overvalued then the" rent set may be 
greater than the true economic rent. All five farms 
illustrated in Table 8 would. make losses if the rent was 
set as 5 per cen,t of a ren~al value greater than $40,000. 
Al though this may have little effect on'~resource 
allocation in the short rUl), becausethereS-Qurce 
L\-l,,~~tl' . 
structure described by farm four would minimise losses, 
in the long run these five farms would cease to operate" 
If the rental value is undervalued lessees may be 
rewarded with their transfer earnings ann normal profits 
on their capital without achieving the most efficient 
1 .. From Equation (8.1) the rental value will be overvalued 
if improvements are undervalued .. 
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allocation of resources. 
As the rental value is determined in the manner 
described by Equation (8~1),it is only as accurate as 
the valuation of improvements" If the value of improvements 
is under-estimated then clearly the rental value will be 
over-estimated, and vice versa. When economic rent is 
paid to the landlord each -year the tenan.t will make normal 
profits only on his investment in improvements. However, 
as discussed in Chapter VI ,.- the existence of these normal 
profits is essential for the maintenance of the 
productivity of these improvements. The expectation of 
future quasi-rents, although restricted to the normal 
profit level, is essential to motivate tenants to implement 
improvements even if economic rent is paid each year for 
land" An incoming tenan-b would be prepared to pay the 
discounted normal profits of the improvements for them. 
In the competitive equilibrium situation this would clearly 
equal the market price OI the improvements .. 
The Crown Renewable lease system purports to set 
economic rent as the payment for land at the date of lease 
renewal. The effects of this on resourc.e allocation have 
been considered previously within the framework of 
economic theory under certain restrictive assumptions. In 
order to consider the actual effect of Crown Renewable 
lease tenure on resource allocation it is pertinent to 
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review some factors which may influence this in the real 
world o 1 
The Value of ImErovements 
Mention has been made that the calculated value of 
improvements is related to their transfer earnings. 
However, valuers may not credit improvements with their 
full cost if they do not consider that the improvements are 
being used to the best advantage. The marginal value 
product of a resource may be much greater than its price 
even if it is not fully utilised, and hence it will be 
earning quasi-rento The marginal value product of any 
resource depends on its level of use and the level of 
employment of all the other productive factors. If 
economic rent is set each year then those farmers not at 
the maximum profit point, but proceeding towards it, will 
make losses during the development 'period" Incoming tenants 
would discount these losses when determining the price to 
pay for the incumbent tenants improvements" Hence the 
price paid for improvements in place on~a farm not at the 
maximum profit position, may be less than. the price paid 
for them in the market.. However, as. the Orown Renewable 
1" The relaxation of assumptions inherent in the perfectly 
competitive equilibrium situation has been considered in 
Ohapter VII. 
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lease system bases rent on the estimated value of land, 
it attempts to take into accoun.t the lower producer's 
surpluses expected in the development years.. Purchasers 
can afford to pay up.to.the present value of these 
surpluses, and this will be reflected in the market price 
0.£ land and hence· the rent set under renewable leases .. 
The procedu:!'e of allocating only a proportion of cost to 
improvements, Which valuers consider are not being used to 
the best advan~age, is therefore an attempt to ensure that 
full economic rent is set as the payment for land .. 
The prices paid for land reflect future economic 
rents.. To calculate the value of an improvement to be less 
than its cost, owing to its present usage, may be no 
estimate of its future productivity. The tenant may not 
make normal profits on his investment if it is included at 
less than cost and if the rent is n'ot renewed for some 
period" If the rent is not renewed every year then the 
value of improvements must be based on their future as 
well as present productivity" 
Guise (1966) has outlined a view· commonly held by 
valuers .that the value of an improvement is its real cost 
to the farmer and not its actual transfer earnings.. As 
many expenses of farm development are "tax..,.deductible the 
real cost to a farmer of adding improvements is less than 
the price he pays for them in the market.. It is considered 
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that the value of improvements should be related to the 
after-tax cost to the farmer rather than their transfer 
earnings. All investment and consumption decisions are 
made by individuals in an after-tax framework. 1 As present 
and future taxation payments are influenced by present and 
future net revenues, the price paid fOT farm land will 
reflect the influence of taxation:.. Hence, taking 
cognisance of this influence when valuing improvements is 
in accord with attempting to set economic rent. 
Valuers have considerable practicable difficulty in. 
assessing the cost of invisible improvements such as 
original developmen.t work. Yet, as this is attempted by the 
valuation procedure, it can lead to 'wide variations in the 
calculation of the value of improvelllents~2 
Patently it is impossible to determine precisely the 
value of improvements.. To ascertain whether or not they 
are earning quasi-rent requires that the value productivity 
of the im~rovements be calculated, a notoriously difficult 
pr0blem. 3 As a proportion. of the cost is often attributed 
1.. This has been further aisJ~mssed -.tn.Chapter II .. 
2.. This problem is discussed in detail in a research paper 
compiled by the Valuation Department 'snd entitled 'A 
Cri tical Study of the Unimproved Value of Lan,d"!~,..., 1968 .. 
3 .. Estimation of the marginal value product of a resource 
within a firm by a positive method requires production 
function analysis. Lewis (1969) discusses the problems with 
this approach in 'Discussion Paper No:.9', a publication of 
the Lincoln College Agricultural Economics Research Unit .. 
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to improvements, on the basis of some arbitrary judgement, 
and their present or future productivity not investigated, 
it seems likely that the value of improvements under the 
present lease system may be under-estimated and hence with 
its consequential effect on resource allocation, the rental 
value over-estimated. 
The Renewal Period 
The rent is renewed every 33 years under the present 
Crown Renewable lease system. This means that although 
the rent may be an approximation of economic rent at the 
commencement of the lease, it is unlikely to be so during 
it.. Factors such as technical change and varying prices 
ensure that economic rent will fluctuate markedly over time~ 
In the past, the 33 year time span has enabled 
tenants to reap any quasi-rents· their improvements have 
earned.. It has also meant that those farms earning normal 
profi ts, or more, in" the past were not forced to develop. 
They could maintain the· status quo and enjoy any surplus 
profits, just as those who owned freehold properties .. 
As was pointed out in the 'previous chapter, a lag effect 
occurring when eco,nomic rent is imposed may result in a 
reduction in the profitability of tenant investment rather 
than acting as a spur to increase,d output .. 
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The 33 year renewal period has n.ot encouraged lessees 
to think about the form of tenure under which they are 
farming~ It often comes as a surprise when they are 
confronted with increased rents at the end of a lease 
. d 1 perlo .. Shorter periods between lease renswals would 
encourage an awareness by the tenants of the effects of 
Crown Renewable lease tenure on their investment plans~ 
The Capital Market and Crown Renewable Lease Tenure 
Setting economic rent as the rent of land assumes 
that the other productive factors are in perfectly elastic 
supply. 1 It implies that a perfect, or near-perfect 
capi tal marke t confronts each tenant ~ . 
The concept of forcing tenants to be rewarded only 
the normal profits on their investment, while acceptable 
in theory, poses difficulties in-the real world. In an 
imperfect capital market, where borrowing ability is a 
function of assets owned rather than -the profitability of 
investment opportunities, all len.ding agencies require 
some margin of security" Lessees can .. offer their own. 
capital as security, and hence may borrow some proportion 
1~·This is noted in the 'Report of the Committee of 
Investiga tion into Rentals and Freeholding Crown. Leases I , 
1968. 
2~ Labour is also unlikely to be in perfectly elastic supply" 
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of it" Clearly the supply of tenant owned capital will 
differ between tenants and consequently so will the 
available supply of loan fundso Tenants who have a low 
equity may not be able to borrow to expand output even 
if the lease system insists that they do. 
For those farmers whose equity is low, increased 
borrowing 'Jan often take place only by the payment of 
higher interest rates. This may obviously not be 
profitable for the tenant who cannot afford to pay some 
normal profit rate for the use of capital. 
The first requirement of lending agencies is that 
the enterprise is not making a loss prior to the 
injection of loan capital.. Charging tenants economic 
rent may force· some to make losses. Such tenants are 
unlikely to be able to borrow funds in order to finance 
development and thus attain a profitable level of output" 
In an environment where there is some hierarchy of 
investments, determined by the profitability of each? it 
is unrealistic to expect capital to flow into an industry 
or enterprise where it will make only its transfer 
earnings. This factor also may influence the amount of 
investment carried out on land owned by the Crown and 
let under renewable lease tenure. 
156 
The Market Price of Farms 
The procedure by which rent is determined assumes 
that there is a competitive market ,for farm land in 
each district~ This condition may not always be valid, 
especially in isolated areaS. 
The effects of different farm sizes on rent are 
incorp6rated in the rent calculation~ The market price 
I 
of land is influenced by its acreage which in turn 
affects the rental value and consequently the rento 
The prices paid for farms are influenced by any 
factor which affects the expected net in.come stream 
associ:ated with these properties.. The part pl.ayed by 
I 
I ' 
taxation has already been discussed.. The prices paid 
for productive factors by farmers wi;!.l also influen:ce 
the pr,iqe paid for land" Farm priceF may i therefore 
reflect, to some extent, imperfections in the fuarket 
for puoductive factors o 
The Allocation of Resources 
The Crown Renewable lease system attempts to set 
economic rent as the rent tenants pay for land. The 
effect on resource allocation of demanding economic 
rent from tenants has been reviewed within the 
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framework of ec:onomic theory under restrictive 
assumptions. Its prime effect is to fol:'ce tenants to 
attain an efficient allocation of resources. If the 
rent actually set is greater than the economic rent 
tenant firms will make losses. Although in-the short 
run. they may continue to operate, they will n.ot in the 
long run. Q Tenants can be rewarded wi th their transfer 
earnings and make normal profits on their capital 
without achieving the maximum profit level of output 
if the rent is set lower than the true economic rent. 
Tenants leasing land under renewable lease tenure have 
the option of purchasing the land. The profitability 
of this course of action to the tenant and its comparison 
with farm development is also affected by- the level of 
rent. 
The rental value, and hence the rent~ under the 
Crown. Renewable lease system is based on the market price 
of farms, less some in.dependent assessment of the value 
of improvements. 1 Owing to the existing valuation 
procedure, it seems likely that the value of improvements 
may be under-estimated, with its attendant effects on. 
resource allocation. 
1" In this instance the market pri.ce of farms has been 
assumed to be paid for the land improvements only. 
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There is now a need to investigate the real world 
situation where the effects of current valuation 
philosophy are confounded by such real world factors as 
those listed previously. This can be done by means of 
an empirical investigation with the objective of producing 
further hypotheses about the effect of Crown. Renewable 
lease tenure on resource allocation in the real world" 
Such an investigation was beyond the scope of this study. 
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OHAPTER IX 
GOODWILL 
The prices paid for improvements on leasehold 
properties have in. the past often approximated the 
capital value of these properties. 1 Those associated with 
administering leasehold land in New Zealand have 
developed the concept of goodwill to explain the 
difference between the calculated value of improvements 
and the price paid for them in the markete The amount 
which incoming tenants pay for the improvements, in 
excess of the value of improvements is held to be 
goodwill~ If MVI is the price paid for'the improvements 
6f a leasehold property, then 
Goodwill = MVI - VI 
where the value of improvements VI is calculated at the 
sale date of the property.. Goodwill is commOnly divided 
into two components 8 The first is termed 'lessee's 
interest' by the Valuation of Land Act 1951, and 
'goodwill' by the proposed amendment to the 1948 Land 
1. Examples of this are provided by Eville (1967, pe 135) .. 
160 
Act .. 1 The second form of goodwill is given by the total 
goodwill less the lessee's interest calculated at that 
date.. These two components of goodwill can be defined as 
Goodwill = G + G 
where G represents lessee's inte::c.est and G the residual" 
Lessee's Interest 
Lessee's interest under Crown Renewable lease 
tenure is defined as the present value of rent payments, 
to the end of the lease, which would occur if the lease 
was renewed at this date, and at the same rental rate, 
less the present value of the actual rent payments to the 
end of the lease. 2 If the rental value-R at the 
o 
beginning of the lease increases at the rate.."o each year, 
then at time t, 
33-t 
Lessee's interest = ~=1 (Ro (1+I")t - Ro)r33 d j 
i. The essential points contained in this amen.dment are 
summarised in Appendix VI .. 
2" The discussion. assumes that the rental value increases 
over time.. The concepts developed are readi'ly modified to 
consider the instance where the ren.tal value falls over 
time. 
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using the terminology established previouslYe 1 The 
source of lessee's interest is illustrated in Figure 19. 
Rent payments in each year, described in Figure 
19, assume that the rental value, and hence the rent, 
increases at a constant annual rate. At time zero the 
lessee farming under Crown Renewable lease tenure has 
the rent renewed every 33 yea!s, and faces future rent 
payments described by the stepped line A,B,C,D,E,F e 
However, if the rent was renewed every year at the same 
rental rate, he would have to pay rent according to the 
line AC'CE, It is advocated, that because the lease is 
not renewed every year, the lessee enjoys some goodwill 
which is expressed by th~ areas ABC and CDE in Figure 
19. 2 Lessee's Interest is the present ~~lue of a 
particular component of this goodwill. In Figure 19 
lessee's interest, if calculated at tims t, is given by 
the value of the area A'C'B'B at te 
Lessee's interest oversimplifies this form of 
goodwill. In Figure 19 the incoming or incumbent tenant 
at time t will regard the discounted value of the areas 
1. Lessee's In~erest is discussed in detail by MeB9Cooke 
(1967)" He has pointed out that there may be components 
other than the present value of a difference in rent pay-
ments in~luded in the Lessee's Interest,-depending on the 
terms of the lease. However, it is this aspect of Lessee's 
Interest which is included in the proposed 1970 amen.dment 
to the 1948 Land Aot. 
2 .. This aspect is reviewed in the 'Report of the Committee 
of Investigation into Rentals and Freeholding of Crown 
Leases' (1968,p.13). 
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A'C'CB,CDE, and so on to his planning horizon as the 
asset he is purchasing or owns~ As defined above, 
lessee's interest does nDt consider any goodwill beyond 
the current lease period.. It also assumes that if the 
rent was renewed every year it would not increase between 
time t and the end of the lease period. 
LesseeYs interest is held by many to be an asset 
peculiar to the tenant because he is paying a lower 
rent than that which he would have to pay if the rent 
was renewed during the lease period. Incoming tenants 
will be prepared to buy this asset from the outgoing 
tenants as they too would derive benefit from it.. Hence, 
lessee's interest is regarded as part of the goodwill 
which is paid for improvements~ 
If this form of goodwill does exist it should 
belong to the Crown. at the time the property is freeholded. 1 
The presence of lessee's interest is base-d-on the 
premise that the rent the lessee is actually paying is 
too low.. Hence, it belongs to the Crown. and not to the 
tenant at the time of freeholding.. It is inconsistent 
to claim that the rent is too high and that goodwill 
should be paid to the lessee, as, if the rent is too high, 
this form of goodwill will not exist .. 
1. Contrary to a clause contained in:_ the proposed 1970 
amendment to the 1948 Land Act .. 
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The existence of lessee's interest rests on the 
proposition that, if the rent was renewed every year, the 
same rental rate associated with the Crown Renewable 
lease system would be used. Lease systems which are the 
same in all respects other than their time of renewal 
and rental rate are not distinct phenomena, but are 
inter-related" 1 This is demonstrated by Equation (4 .. 4) 
which expresses the rental rate of a system involving 
yearly rent revisions as a function of a system with a 
different renBwal period and rental rate. These systems 
are equivalent, as neither the lessee nor the landlord 
will prefer one to the other. The rent payments of a 
one year lease system, determined as a function of the 
Crown Renewable lease system, are shown as GE' in Figure 
19" The present value of this latter rental stream is 
equal to the present value of the rent payments shown 
by the stepped line A,B,C,D,E.. The 33 year renewal 
period can therefore be regarded as an approximation to 
a one year system, equivalent in every way except for the 
renewal period and rental rate. Hence the component of 
goodwill called lessee's interest does :riot exist. 
Nevertheless, there is a valid form of goodwill 
created by the Crown. Renewable lease system" The present 
value of rent payments over the 33 year lease period has 
1. This has been discussed in detail in Chapter IV" 
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to be the same for both one year and 33 year renewal 
systems if the lessee is to be indifferent between them. 1 
If the lessee terminates rent payments during a lease 
period by freeholding, the two lease systems may not 
provide him with the same present value of rent payments, 
where the relationship between the two systems is derived 
from Equation C4.4). Goodwill at any time should maintain 
this equality of the present value of rent payments for 
both systems. Figure 20, which is drawn. from a 
hypothetical example, illustrates the goodwill created by 
the Orown. Renewable lease system. If the lessee t s 
discount rate is assumed to be 7 per cent and the annual 
growth in rental val~e 5 per cent, then the rental rate 
which will give the same present value of rent payments 
as the Orown Renewable lease system and a yearly renewed 
2 system, is 2.56 per cent. The initial rental value is 
assumed to be $100 and the rent payable each year under 
Crown Renewable lease tenure for the first lease period is 
1. It has been assumed tha::ptthe relationship between· the one 
year and 33 ye~r systems ha~ been established so that the 
landlord is al~o indifferent between these systems. 
2. Calculated from Equation (4.4) with r33 = .05. 
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and for the second period 
The. rent paid in the first year under the one year renewal 
system is 
and this rent payment increases at the rate of 5 per cent 
per annum.. The rent payments of these two lease systems 
are graphed in Figure 20. 
The lessee who pays rent according to the 33 year 
Crown. lease system will pay more each year thatl he would 
under the one year system, un.,til 0 is reached in Figure 20 .. 
After year 0 the rent payments will be less than those 
that would be made un.der the annually-reviewed system. 
If the lessee freeholds the property at any time, say t, 
during the lease p~riod, the present value of rent 
payments actually made by him up to year t may be greater 
than the present value of rent payments he would have made 
under the annually-reviewed system. The present value of 
I rent payments made un.der the Orown Renewable lease system 
up to year t is given by:1 
1. Using the terminology established previously. 
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(9.2) 
The present value of rent instalments which would have 
been paid under the one year renewal system up to time 
t is given by : 
Goodwill payable to the lessee at time t will equate 
the present values expressed in Equation (9.2) and 
Equation (9.3), and therefore at year t goodwill is 
given by: 
The goodwill defined by Equation (9.4) is that 
amoun.t of money which, if paid to the lessee at time t, 
will ensure that he remains indifferent between the two 
1 lease systems~ If the lessee freeholds at time t the 
landlord will have to pay the goodwill calculated by 
Equation (9~4) in order not to penalise the .lessee for 
paying rent under the 33 year renewal system rather 
1. The discoun.t rate is again that rate which is 
acceptable to both the landlord and the lessee .. 
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than the one year system.. Clearly, if the improvements 
on the property are sold, the incoming tenant will be 
prepared to pay, and indeed in a competitive market, will 
have to pay, for the goodwill existing at the time of 
purchase" 
Goodwill payable at t can also be determined by 
subtracting the value at t of rent payments to be made 
between year t and the end of the lease under the 33 year 
renewal system, from the value at t of payments to be 
made for the same period under the one year system. 
This is described in Equation (9.5). 
Goodwill calculated by Equation (9.5) will be the same 
as that determined by Equation (9.4). 1 
Goodwill and lessee's interest are compared in 
Figure 20.. At year t lessee's interest is given by the 
value at t of the area CFEDa The real goodwill created 
by the Crown Renewable lease system at t, is given by the 
value at t of the area AA'C or the area CJD. 
1. This con'1lusion is justified in Appendix V. 
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Goodwill and Compensation 
The question of compensation arises whenever a lease 
is transferred, freeholded or renewed. At these times 
the value of the lessee's capital employed with the land 
has to be determined. 
At the date of freeholding or lease renewal, the 
lessee is rewarded with the value of improvements set 
by the Land Settlement Board under the terms of Crown 
Renewable lease tenure. It has already been established 
that the value of improvements is closely related to 
their cost, or a proportion of their cost, to the lessee. 
Hence the Crown,. Renewable lease system does not 
compensate the tenant on the basis of the value 
productivity of his improvements, but attempts to reward 
him on the basis of their cost or transfer earnings .. 
Compensating the lessee in this way is clearly consonant 
with the concept of economic rent.. The effects of this 
form of compensation on resource allocation has been 
examined in Chapter VIII .. 
The incoming tenant has to enter a market and bid 
for the incumbent lessee's improvements. Mention has 
been made of the fact that in the past the prices paid 
for improve/IDents have often been in 'the region of the 
capital values of the respective properties at the date 
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of sale o Goodwill is the concept used·to explain the 
difference between this market price and the value of 
improvements at that date o If G1 is the goodwill 
required to equate the present value of rent payments 
from the 33 year and one year lease systems, then the 
residual goodwill is given by 
IT = MVI ~ VI - G1 
using the terminology previously established o If the 
tenants were charged economic rent each year, incoming 
tenants could afford to offer only up to the present 
value of the normal profits earned by the existing 
tenant capital.. This would approximate the· calculated 
value of improvements and G1 would be the only for~ 
of goodwill purchased, or 
MVI = VI + G1 
In practice there is usually some residual goodwill 
paid by the incoming tenant. There are two main 
reasons for thiso 
Firstly, owing to the long renewal period, many 
tenants have not been aware that rent set under Crown 
Renewable lease tenure purports to approximate economic 
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rent~ They have realised that it is a cash lease, but 
not that it may draw off some o~ the value productivity 
of improvements o In this situation incoming tenants would 
offer up to the present value of the quasi-rent earned 
by existing improvements, plus expected quasi-rent earned 
by future development. The residual goodwill exists 
because the value of the improvements is restricted to an 
estimate of their transfer earnings by the method of 
valuation, yet purchasers pay the outgoing tenant on the 
basis of the value productivity of improvements. 
Secondly, prospective lesse~s, early in. a lease 
period may pay for improvements on the basis of their 
productivity even if they understand the implications 
of the lease system. When 20 or 30 years of a lease 
period remain, the incoming tenant may expect to reap 
most of the quasi-rents generated by his improvements. 
An incoming tenant who pays the outgoing tenant 
some residual goodwill is, owing to the method used to 
calculate the rental value, is likely to have all, or a 
portion, of this goodwill incorporated in the rental 
value in subsequent rent revisions. 1 Although this is 
consonant with drawing off economic rent, this reduction 
in tenant equity may have a marked influence on his 
ability to carry out on-farm investment plans. 
1. The method by which the ren.tal value is determined 
is outlined in Chapter VIII~ 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study was implemented in three parts~ 
Firstly, the history of Crown. own.ership of land in New 
Zealand was reviewed and the terms of Crown. Renewable 
lease tenure outlined~ Secondly, some on-farm investment 
alternatives were evaluated within the frame-work of the 
Crown Renewable lease systemo The last section examined 
the method used by the Crown. to set rent under the 
conditions pertain~ng to renewable leases, and its effect 
on tenant investment plans. 
The terms of Ct-oWn. Renewable lease tenure 
have evolved over the past hundred years, culminating 
in the 1948 Land Act and its subsequent amendments~ The 
right of lessees to purchase the land was established 
at the beginning of this century and has remained of 
paramount importance. At present a further amendment to 
the 1948 Land Act is being considered~ 
Models were developed in order to'facilitate 
an examination of investment alternatives within the 
frame work of the Crown. Ren.ewable lease system" These 
can be used in an analysis of investment options on any 
Crown. Renewable lease property.. Two of these models in 
particular may have more general'applicability" The 
first describes the internal rate of return to the landlord 
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from owning and letting land e The second enables two 
lease systems which are the same in every respect other 
than their rental rates and renewal periods to be 
related in a manner which ensures that both lessee and 
landlord are indifferent between theme 
Some on-farm investment alternatives open to a 
tenant of 2> Orown Renewable lease property were investi-
gated by means of a case study. The development 
programme carried out by the lessee between 1963 and 
1969 was almost certainly more profitable than free-
holding in 1963e This was influenced by the fact that 
the development programme was extremely profitable. 
However, it appeared that the lessee should have 
freeholded the property in 1969 on the completion of the 
development programme, if the expected increase in 
rental value had been greater than 5 per cent per annum 
and if the property was not to be sold in the near 
future e The ownership of the land by the Orown since 
1937 has been profitable from its point of view. These 
results pertain only to the farm from which they were 
derivede 
The Crown Renewable lease system bases rent on the 
price paid for land plus improvements, less some 
independent estimate of the value of these improvements. 
The Crown therefore sets rent according to the principles 
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of economic rent. The main effect of this on -tenant 
plans has been reviewed within the framework of 
economic theory, and is to insist that tenants achieve 
an efficient allocation of resources. It seems likely 
that "the rental value may be over-estimated owing to 
the current method of valuing improvements o The 
consequent.-:'al effect' of setting an excessive rent may 
have little influence in the short run, but is likely 
to force a misallocation of resources in the long run o 
The form of goodwill, termed lessee's interest 
in this study, was demonstrated not to exist. However, 
there does remain a form of goodwill created by the 
Crown Renewable lease system. This goodwill exists in 
order to maintain the equitability, to both landlord 
and tenant, of the present Crown Renewable lease tenure 
and a system in which the rent is renewed every year. 
This goodwill is an asset which belongs to the lessee 
at the time of freeholding. 
The- level of rent set by the Crown under renewable 
lease tenure, and the frequency with which it is reviewed 
affects both the efficiency of resource allocation, and 
the tenant decision of whether or not to freehold. 
Factors which may influence this in the real world -were 
reviewed. There remains however, a necessity for an 
empirical study, designed to explore the actual effect of 
Crown Renewable lease tenure on resource allocation. 
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. APPENDIX I 
THE NET PRESENT VALUE OF OWNING AND LETTING LAND 
The landlord purchases the resource and lets it to 
obtain an income stream over time.. The profitability of 
this course of action is given by the net present value of 
the annual net revenues generated by purchasing and 
letting the resource~ 
The landlord invests the rental value Ro at the 
beginning of the first year to gain the rent for that year 
plus the asset value at the end of that year, or, using 
the terminology previously established 
- R + r 'R + R ( 1 +.p) 
o 1 0 0 
where the rent is paid at the end of the year and is 
renevied every year.. The net present value of this cash 
flow is given. by~ 
NPV 
The following year, Ro (1+,.0) is invested to obtain 
a further rent payment and the asset value at the end of 
that year.. Xhe net present value over two years can be 
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writteng 
If the resource is sold in year n this can be extended to: 
NPV 
R r _( 1~2.n-1 +~~ •• + 0 1nmn R +*1+;0 n + 0 . n +l 
This describes the net present value to a landlord 
of owning and letting a resource, from the present to the 
year n, where the rent is renewed annually at a constant 
rental rate~ 
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APPENDIX II 
THE INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN TO THE LANDLORD 
The following expression explains the net present 
value from the landlord's point of view o 1 
The internal rate of return is obtained by equating this 
to zero and solving for r the discount rate. The 
following expression is therefore obtained: 
r 
f1 +,.o1n 1 
1 = 1+r n + ( 1 +r ) 
If r = r 1 ;+;0 for all n, then r + 1 = r 1 +,P+ 1 is a root 
of the above equation~ 
Substitute for r+1 
1. From Appendix I. 
Let a = 
1 = 
(1 +f11 
(r 1 +;0+ ) 
r 1 ( 2 n-1) n 1+a+a +~~o,o+ a +a 
A ( 1 2 n-1) . t . . s +a+a +~ .. 0";' a 1S a geome r1C ser1es 
1 = 
but (1-a) = 
[ 1-alil an 1-a J + 
r 1 +1' + 1 -1 -"c 
r 1 +;0+1 = 
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Hence (1+r) = r 1+,o+1 is a root of the equation describing 
the net present value and 
is the internal rate of return to the landlord irrespective 
of the year the resource is sold. 
185 
APPENDIX III. 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEASE SYSTEMS 
A form of lease system is assumed in which the rent 
is determined by the product of the rental value and the 
rental rate" It has been shown in Chapter III that the 
present value of payments of a system in which the rent 
is renewed every t years is given by~ 
PVt rtRo t 1 H+~jt t= 1 = (1+i) k + rtRo +1 t k=1 (1 +i)k +. ~ ~ • k=1 
Let A = H~, +1 
d 1 = (1 +i) 
t 
dk Dt = L k=1 
Then 
This l~ase system can be related to any other where the 
rent is·determined in the same way_ A lease system with 
a renewal period of t years can be reduced to t period~ 
of a lease system in which the rent is renewed every year~ 
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Let the rent be renewed every year and PV1 be the 
present value of payments of this system, t being some 
year in the future~ If ren',t is paid at the end of each 
year, then: 
If it is assumed that the only difference between 
two lease systems is their renewal period and ren"tal rate, 
then if the present value of the payments associated with 
these systems is the same, the lessee and landlord will be 
indifferent between them. 1 Equate PV1 and PV t to obtain: 
or 
1.. Assuming the landlord's and tenant ' s discount rates are 
equal. 
187 
r 1 as expressed by this equation is defined as the rental 
rate of an annually-reviewed system which will equate the 
present value of payments of that system with one which is 
renewed every t years~ 
This analysis can be extended to relate systems 
renewed every t years with those whose renewal period is 
T years .. From the 'forgoing: 
Equate present values and rearrange to obtain~ 
r -T -
If r 1 is determined as a function of a system in which the 
ren.t is renewed every t years, then it can be substituted 
in the above equation and a rental rate r T solved for, 
which will give the same present value of payments for 
systems renewed every T and t years. In this way lease 
systems in which the only differences are the renewal 
periods and rental rates can be related. 
Table 9.provides examples of rental rates which will 
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TABLE 9 
Rental Rates Providing the Same Present Value of Payments 
as the Crown Renewable Lease System 
years between per cent rate of increase in 
rent renewals rental value 
2 4 6 8 
1 .0395 ,,0304 .0228 .0166 
11 • '84-32 .0365 .03 _. ~0241 
22 .0469 .0433 .0393 .0352 
give a stream of rent payments with the same present 
values as that of the Crown. Renewable lease system for 
leases with different renswal periods, and for a given 
rate of increase in rental value. The discount rate has 
been assumed to be 6 per cent" 
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APPENDIX IV 
THE DISCOUNT RATE FOR AFTER-TAX INVESTMENT EVALUATION 
Individuals make their consumption _Stnd investment 
decisions within an after-tax framework. The New Zealand 
taxation system to which individuals' incomes are 
subjected is a. progressive one. This means that as an 
individual's income increases, the tax rate on the extra 
income earned increases.. It is subject to an income 
level below which no tax is paid and a limit above which 
any further income is taxed at a constant rate. The 
evaluation of investment options from an in.dividual 
farmer's viewpoint is complicated by the fact that interest 
paid in any year is a tax-deductible expense whereas 
interest received is a taxable revenue. 1 
Borrowing 
The interest payments made by farmers who have 
borrowed for consumption or productive investment are tax-
deductible.. As the present tax structure ~s a progressive 
one, the cost of borrowing is a curvilinear function of 
1 .. When borrowing or lending, tax payments are not affected 
by the principal. 
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the amount borrowed. Figure 21 describes the after-tax 
cash surplus as a function of the level of borrowing 
carried out in the previous year. 1 As no principal is 
repaid out of the cash surplus it reflects only the interest 
payments made on previously borrowed money. 2 AB i-s linear 
because it incorporates the assumption that interest 
payments"ara not tax-deductible" The line CB describes 
the reduction in the after-tax cash surplus which occurs 
under a progressive taxation system when money is borrowed 
and interest payments are tax-deductible. The curve CB 
approximates the stepped line which would result under a 
progressive taxation system. 3 Above F interest is paid 
out of the after-tax cash surplus at the highest marginal 
tax rate. As the after-tax cash surplus is reduced, the 
taxation rate'decreases and hence the effect of the 
borrowing rate on the cash surplus increases. AtE the 
tax exemption is reached, and therefore below E the 
taxation system has no further influence on the effective 
borrowing rate" The slope of AB is given by the negative 
borrowing rate paid to the moneylender" The slope of CB 
1. In Figure 2l tax is assumed to be paid in the year in 
which the income, on which the tax is based, occurs. 
2. Figure 21 incorporates the assumption that the marginal 
cost of borrowing remains constant over the amount 
borrowed" 
3. The marginal ta,x rate remains constant wi thin certain 
ranges of income. ' 
After 
Tax 
Cash 
Surplus 
B 
F~-
E 
Borrowing and Taxation 
After 
Tax 
Cash 
Surplus 
0' Money Borrowed 
(in Previous Year) 
Figure 21 
, 
Lending and Taxation 
Money Lent 
(in Previous Year) 
Figure 22 
->. 
~ 
->. 
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at each point is given by the reduction in. cash surplus 
which occurs when one unit of money is borrowed at that 
cash surplus. Of the interest rate (i) paid to the 
moneylender a proportion is met from taxation. If r is 
the marginal tax rate at a particular cash surplus and i 
is paid to the moneylender when $1 is borrowed, then the 
reduction in taxation (.6T) is given by: 1 
£:::,. T = ir 
The reduction in the after-tax cash surplus (60S) 
resulting from borrowing $1 is then: 
60S = -i+6T 
= -i+ir 
= -i~ (1-r) 
The marginal tax rate is different for each level of cash 
surplus between E and F in Figure 21 and hence the slope 
of this line changes between these two limits~ 
Owing to the influence of taxation, the real cost 
to a farmer of paying interest on $1 for a year at a 
particular cash surplus is not given by i but by i(1-r) 
where r is appropriate to the particular cash surplus~ 
1~ i and r in this discussion are expressed as decimals~ 
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As the marginal tax rate under the progressive taxation 
system is constant over income ranges, the real cost of 
borrowing will also be constant over these ranges. 
Lending 
The interest received by farmers in a particular 
year is taxable in that year. This has the effect of 
lowering the real interest rate earned by funds which 
farmers lend. This is demonstrated in Figure 22 where 
the after-tax cash surplus in a particular year is assumed 
to be composed entirely of interest received from money 
lent the previous year. It therefore includes no loan 
repayments. The line OE'G assumes that interest received 
is not tax-deductible, an.d hence the slope is given by the 
interest rate i. The lin.e DE'F' represents the situation 
where interest received is subject to a progressive 
taxation system. Again E denotes the level of tax 
exemption and F the point at which the highest marginal 
tax rate is reached. 
The slope of OE'F' at any point is giver;t. by extra 
interest received when $1 is lent the previous year, less 
the extra taxation paid or, 
194 
Slope == i - ir 
== i(1-r) 
where r is the marginal tax rate at that particular level 
of cash surplus. 
The effective interest rate which a farmer receives 
on money he has lent, is therefore less than the actual 
rate paid by the institution or person who borrows the 
money. 
The Implic~tions for Investment Analysis 
Men.tion has been made that investment analysis from 
the individual farmer's viewpoint is based on the market 
rate of interest. 1 The influence of taxation can be 
examined by reference to the two period case as described 
in Figure 23!? The individual's consumable or after-tax 
income distribution is denoted by A.. He can borrow or 
lend from this position in order to alter the distribution 
of his income' between the :two years" The line XY describes 
the opportunities for borrowing or lending assuming that 
1. To facilitate exposition it has been assumed that there 
is one rate of interest at which individuals can lend or 
borrow money. 
2. The two period case has been discussed in detail by 
Hirshleifer (1958)" 
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taxation is unaffected by interest" Money borrowed in year 
1 must be repaid with interest in year 2" Hence, the 
slope of XY is given by -(1+i).. By moving to the left of 
A along XY, the individual can redistribute his consumption 
by lending, to the right by borrowing" Investment 
decision theory normally assumes that the individual can 
move along XY in order to obtain his optimum inter temporal 
consumption pattern" 
However, interest in fact affects taxation and hence 
the individual's consumable income" If he borrows in year 
1 then he will have to repay principal, plus interest less 
the reduction in taxation caused by the interest payment~ 
in year 2. If he lends in year 1 he will receive his 
interest and principal less any extra tax caused by the 
interest received, in year 2.. The borrowing and lending 
opportunities which actually confront the individual at 
A in Figure 23,-are described by the line CD" The slope 
of this lins at any point ~ill be given. by: 
Slope = - (1+i(1-r)) 
where r is the marginal tax rate appropriate to the second 
year cash surplus at that point" Clearly, CD will be 
parallel with XY only if sufficient money is borrowed in 
year1 to lower the year 2 cash surplus, by the interest 
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payments, to the level of the individua1 9 s exemptions~ 
The implications which can. be drawn from this are 
important from the standpoint of investment evaluation~ 
Previous theory held that the in.dividual could move along 
XY in Figure 23, but the effect of "taxation is to ensure 
that where the individual is on XY determines the initial 
tax structure, and hence the borrowing or lending 
opportunity curve he can move along. There will therefore 
be a different opportunity curve for each point on XYo 
This is exemplified by the curve FG at point Eo There is 
also the possibility that some point inside XY gives a 
higher actuai lending and borrowing opportunity curve over 
some region:, than some points on XYo This is illustrated 
in Figure 24.. The net present value rule or internal 
rate of return rule incorporating the market interest rate 
i would choose investments which place XY further from the 
origin.. Olearly in this instance these rules would not 
choose income stream L in preferenne to A in Figure 24~ 
Yet, the income stream denoted by L is obviously preferable 
to that of A, for it places the actual borrowing and lending 
opportup.i ty curve further from the origin~ To compare 
alternative income streams in an after-tax framework on the 
basis of th~i msrket rate of interest may precipitate an. 
incorrect choice~ 
A method by which this problem may be. overcome, is 
- \ 
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to trace out the opportunity curves and define regions 
where one point is preferable to another~ This would pose 
real difficulities if more than two time periods were 
considered. 
This study has approached the problem by modifying 
the market In,terest rate and using this as the discount 
rate in thE net present value formula. In Figure 24, A 
is assumed to be the base net cash flow. The appropriate 
discount rate for the comparison of alternatives with A 
is given by the cost of borrowing $1 at A. This discount 
rate is given by, 
, Discount Rate = i (1-r) 
using the terminology described previously and where r is 
the marginal tax rate appropriate to the after-tax cash 
surplus OE' in Figure 24. It is hypothesised that this 
rate approximates as closely as possible the individual's 
relevant decision-making d.iscoun,t rate" Where an 
alternative income stream has a higher marginal tax rate 
in year 2, than- that appropr.iate to OE', the discoun,t 
rate derived above will over-estimate the real interest 
rate.. However, a discoun,t rate lower than that determined 
by Equation (A .. 4 .. 1) cannot be used where A is compared with 
another income stream as this may lead to an erroneous 
1 
. 1 conc USlon. 
199 
This is illustrated in Figure 24 where 
alternative N, although falling below SS', the lending 
or borr0wing opportunity curve, is held to be profitable 
by a line l'IllYr," calculated on the basis of a lower discount 
rate appropriate to SS' at K. 
The discount rate for after-tax investment evaluation 
where the individual borrows to redistribute his consumption 
is clearly not the rate paid to the moneylender., This 
study has used the discount rate calculated by Equation 
(A.4.1) for after-tax evaluation where the marginal tax 
rate is that appropriate to the base nat cash flow.,2 
It is recognised that this analysis is a perfunctory 
examination of what is a complex problem. There is a need 
for further research to investigate the effect of the 
present taxation system on individuals' decisions. 
1. The Targer the' ~-e·t cash surplus the higher will be the 
marginal tax rate and lower the effective borrowing rate. 
2:-Thrs·"mei'thod can only approximate a unique discount rate 
as the base net income stream in this study persists for 
more than'two years, fluctuating between years, and hence 
changing the tax rates accordingly. 
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APPENDIX V 
GOODWILL CREATED BY THE CROWN RENEWABLE LEASE SYSTEM 
Goodwill created by the CroWD. Renewable lease system 
exists in order to maintain the equality of present values 
of rent payments made under the 33 year renewable system 
and the annually-reviewed system, 
The present value of rent payments to be made under 
the 33 year CroWD Renewable lease system for one 33 year 
period is given by 
33 
PV
33 
= R r ~ d j 
o 33~ 
using the established terminology.. If o~ t<.33 then 
the above equation can be rewritten~ 
(A .. 5 .. 1) 
The present value o£ rent palyments to_ be made under 
, " 
the annually-reviewed system? for a period of 33 years is 
described by 
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which can be rewritten: 1 
(Ae5.2) 
For the lessee and lan.dlord to be indifferent between 
. 2 
the two lease systems then Wi must equal PV33 or: 
In.corporating Equation (A.5.1) and Equation (A.5.2) 
By rearranging: 
Multiply through by (1+i)t 
1. The ann.ual rate of change in re·ntal value over the 33 
year period is assumed to be,~ for both tenant and 
landlord. 
2. The lessee and the landlord are assumed to have the 
same decision-ma~ing interest rate. 
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~Or33 t . tA~ (1 +i) t = LdJ - Ror1 j=1 
33-t . 
( 1 +p) t - R 0 r 3 3 
'3-t . 
Ror1 L AJ L dJ (A~5.3) 
j=1 j=1 
Equation (A .. 5~3) demonstrates that the goodwill 
payable to the lessee at time t is the same whether 
calculated as the value at t of the expected difference 
in rent payments between the two systems to the end of 
the lease; or the value at t of the difference in rent 
payments which h~d occurred between the beginning of 
the lease and t .. 
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APPENDIX VI 
PROPOSED LAND AMENDMENT 1970 
The following are the proposed amendments to the 
1948 Land Acto 
(a) The rental rate is altered to 4i per cent~ 
(b) The rent is to be renewed at eleven-year 
intervals .. 
(c) At the time of freeholding the Crown's 
improvements are restricted to what they were 
at the beginning of the lease.. Lessee's 
Interest or Goodwill is to be deducted from 
the rental value to give the freeholding price .. 
The discount rate used to calculated goodwill 
is to be the rental rate o 
(d) For rent renewal purposes the value of 
improvements and the value of land exclusive 
of improvements shall be ascertained on an 
equitable basis between lessee and lessor .. 
The value of Crown improvements is limited to 
the value at the commencement of the lease .. 
